Governance Structures, Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher Education Institutions by Ntim, Collins G. et al.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Ntim, Collins G., Soobaroyen, Teerooven and Broad, Martin J.
Governance Structures, Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher 
Education Institutions
Original Citation
Ntim, Collins G., Soobaroyen, Teerooven and Broad, Martin J. (2016) Governance Structures, 
Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher Education Institutions. 
Accounting, auditing & accountability journal. ISSN 0951-3574 (In Press) 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/25827/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
 1 
 
 
 
Governance Structures, Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher 
Education Institutions   
 
 
 
 
 
Collins G. Ntima, Teerooven Soobaroyenb and Martin J. Broadb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aFinancial Ethics and Governance Research Group 
Department Accountancy and Finance,  
University of Huddersfield Business School 
University of Huddersfield 
Huddersfield, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BCentre for Research into Accounting, Accountability and Governance 
 School Business School 
University of Southampton 
Southampton, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 Corresponding author. Address for correspondence: Financial Ethics and Governance Research Group, Department 
of Accountancy and Finance, University of Huddersfield Business School, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate 
Campus, Queensgate, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 148 447 1038. Fax: +44 (0) 148 447 3148. E-mail: 
c.ntim@hud.ac.uk. 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Governance Structures, Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher 
Education Institutions   
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: We investigate the extent of voluntary disclosures in UK higher education institutions’ (HEIs) 
annual reports and examine whether internal governance structures influence disclosure in the period 
following major reform and funding constraints.  
Design/methodology/approach: We adopt a modified version of Coy and Dixon’s (2004) public 
accountability index, referred to in this paper as a public accountability and transparency index (PATI), to 
measure the extent of voluntary disclosures in 130 UK HEIs’ annual reports. Informed by a multi-
theoretical framework drawn from public accountability, legitimacy, resource dependence and 
stakeholder perspectives, we propose that the characteristics of governing and executive structures in UK 
universities influence the extent of their voluntary disclosures.  
Findings: We find a large degree of variability in the level of voluntary disclosures by universities and an 
overall relatively low level of PATI (44%), particularly with regards to the disclosure of teaching/research 
outcomes. We also find that audit committee quality, governing board diversity, governor independence, 
and the presence of a governance committee are associated with the level of disclosure. Finally, we find 
that the interaction between executive team characteristics and governance variables enhances the level of 
voluntary disclosures, thereby providing support for the continued relevance of a ‘shared’ leadership in 
the HEIs’ sector towards enhancing accountability and transparency in HEIs.  
Research limitations/implications: In spite of significant funding cuts, regulatory reforms and 
competitive challenges, the level of voluntary disclosure by UK HEIs remains low. Whilst the role of 
selected governance mechanisms and ‘shared leadership’ in improving disclosure, is asserted, the varying 
level and selective basis of the disclosures across the surveyed HEIs suggest that the public accountability 
motive is weaker relative to the other motives underpinned by stakeholder, legitimacy and resource 
dependence perspectives.   
Originality/value: This is the first study which explores the association between HEI governance 
structures, managerial characteristics and the level of disclosure in UK HEIs.    
Keywords: governance; voluntary disclosure; public accountability index; higher education; annual 
reports. 
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Introduction 
 
Globally, the past decades have witnessed rapid changes and/or reforms in the higher education 
(HE) sector (Bennett, 2002; Taylor, 2013a, b). In particular, increasing student numbers, declining central 
government funding, tightening regulation, expanding academic curricula and non-academic activities, 
more discerning and demanding multiple stakeholders, increasing national and international competition, 
creeping ‘managerialism’ of academic work/output, un-relenting ‘commoditisation’ of the academic 
service, and increasing ‘corporatisation’ of HEIs, amongst others, have been widely acknowledged 
(Shattock, 1998, 1999; Dearlove, 2002; Toma, 2007; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Parker, 2011; 
Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, b). Equally noticeable is that these 
public sector and HEI reforms have brought to the fore issues of financial management through internal 
governance, public accountability and transparency, and performance within HEIs worldwide (Coy et al., 
1994, 1997; Jones et al., 2001; Oxholm III, 2005; Hordern, 2013), and concurrently concerns about the 
financialisation of HEIs (Nagy and Robb, 2008; Parker, 2013). Observably, the UK has been at the 
forefront of such internal governance reforms (Robins, 1963; Jarratt, 1985; Nolan, 1995, 1996; Dearing, 
1997; Lambert, 2003; Browne, 2010). However, drastic cuts in the further and higher education budget of 
about 29% in 2010 by the UK central government following the 2007/2008 global banking crisis and the 
subsequent implementation of the recommendations of the 2010 Browne Report on HE funding and 
student finance has further heightened the importance of financial management, governance, and 
accountability within UK HEIs (Hordern, 2013; Middlehurst, 2013; Rowlands, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, b), 
thereby offering an interesting and natural setting to examine these aspects. The key aims of this paper, 
therefore, are to: (i) investigate the public accountability and transparency of UK HEIs by focusing on the 
extent of voluntary disclosures in their annual reports[1]; and (ii) examine whether internal governance 
structures influence the level of disclosures by such institutions in the face of recent HEI reforms, 
especially those that have been akin to the introduction of ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market’ conditions. 
 Theoretically, we suggest that HEIs and their managers and governing board members may 
commit to a greater extent of voluntary disclosure for a number of reasons. First, the public accountability 
perspective suggests that managers are inherently trustworthy with greater commitment towards public 
accountability and transparency, and thus are more likely to engage in voluntary disclosure (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991, 1994; Coy et al., 2001). Second, according to legitimacy theory-based predictions 
(Asforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), increased voluntary disclosure can be a strategic means by 
which HEIs can demonstrate congruence of their goals and norms with those of the larger society 
(Reverte, 2009; Chen and Roberts, 2010), with positive consequences for institutional reputation, image 
and public goodwill. Third, stakeholder theory predicts that increased levels of voluntary disclosure 
conveys commitments to greater accountability and transparency (Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Coy and Dixon, 2004), which may be an important way of winning the support of powerful stakeholders, 
such as students, parents, funding bodies, research councils, government, employers and employees 
(Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), 
whose contributions are critical to the long-term viability of HEIs. Fourth, resource-dependence theory 
predicts that increased voluntary disclosure (Coy et al., 1991; Cutt et al., 1993; Vidovich and Currie, 
2011) can help in granting HEIs access to important resources, such as donations, funds, reduced political 
costs through enhanced institutional image and reputation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Chen and Roberts, 2010). In sum, whilst public accountability and legitimacy theories 
primarily conceptualise the broader ‘social’ duties and responsibilities of public sector HEIs and how 
voluntary disclosures seek to reflect such duties and responsibilities, resource dependence and stakeholder 
perspectives tend to be more directly concerned with the instrumental benefits (e.g., student income, 
research funding, donations and corporate support) that may be derived from providing voluntary 
disclosures. Theoretically, we contend that the recent pressures and reforms highlighted by some of the 
previously mentioned studies seem to offer support for the increasing relevance of the last two theoretical 
strands in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosures in the HEI sector. In light of the potential 
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multiplicity of rationales underlying the use of voluntary disclosures, we contend, therefore, that the 
ability of any single theoretical framework to explain the numerous motivations for engaging in voluntary 
disclosures will be limited, and hence, arguably justifying the use of a multi-theoretical framework. 
The extant literature has explored governance, accountability and transparency issues within UK 
HEIs (Gray and Haslam, 1990; Banks et al., 1997; Coy and Pratt, 1998; Sizer and Howells, 2000; Jones et 
al., 2001; Parry, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, b). However, we argue there are a number of research gaps. First, 
existing studies are mainly normative in nature - usually offering critical reflections on the extensive HE 
policy reforms and changes, but often with limited empirical/anecdotal insights (Shattock, 1998, 1999; 
Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Shattock, 2002, 2004; Oxholm III, 
2005; Toma, 2007; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Melville-Ross, 2010; Hordern, 2013). Whilst such critical 
reflections are generally helpful in understanding governance and accountability reforms in the HE sector, 
their insights are impaired by an inability to offer large scale empirical insights on the direct impact of 
such reforms on HEIs to governments, policy-makers and regulatory authorities. Second, and although 
there are a limited number of empirical studies on HEI voluntary disclosure (Coy et al., 1991; Dixon et al., 
1991; Cutt et al., 1993; Coy et al., 1994, 1997; Banks et al., 1997; Coy and Pratt, 1998; Gordon et al., 
2002; CUC, 2000, 2001, 2006; Kezar, 2006; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008), there has been scant attention to 
the UK, and other studies have either been largely descriptive/qualitative in orientation with limited 
theoretical insights or have focused primarily on investigating how general institutional-level 
characteristics, such as size and turnover affect the level of  voluntary disclosure (Gray and Haslam, 1990; 
Coy et al., 2001; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008). In addition, and despite the increasing evidence that 
organisational disclosure decisions, including voluntary ones are largely driven by top management teams 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Beekes and Brown, 2006), studies 
examining how an HEI’s internal governance mechanisms may influence its disclosure are rare (Gordon 
et al., 2002). Arguably, this impairs the current understanding of why and how internal governance 
structures might enhance or limit voluntary disclosures, particularly in the UK context, where there has 
been significant efforts to ‘modernise’ governance structures and standards in HEIs on the basis of 
private-sector models (Schofield, 2009; Parker, 2011).  
 Hence, the current study seeks to address the above gaps, as well as make a number of new 
contributions to the existing HEI governance and accounting literature. First, and using a modified 
version of Coy and Dixon (2004)’s public accountability index (PAI) we contribute to the literature by 
providing contemporary evidence on the level of voluntary disclosure by UK HEIs. This extends the 
findings of prior studies that provide descriptive accounts of the level of disclosure HEIs, particularly in 
the case of the UK (Gray and Haslam, 1990; Banks et al., 1997). To the best of our knowledge, it also 
appears that the PAI has never been applied within the UK HEI context and this study will thus provide a 
relatively robust benchmark to compare with future studies relying on this index or findings from other 
countries. Second, we contribute to the literature by examining the extent to which a HEI’s internal 
governance structure may influence its voluntary disclosure in an HE setting characterised by corporate 
governance developments, recent funding constraints and student access reforms. Arguably, this provides 
an important extension of, and improvement in, previous studies (Banks et al., 1997; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Maingot and Zeghal, 2008) that have only explored how HEI specific features, such as turnover and size, 
affect disclosure. The leadership and oversight roles of governing boards in the UK has been under 
scrutiny for some time, initially in relation to selected institutional failures, but more recently in view of 
competitive, accountability and strategic challenges faced by HEIs, and the question remains as to 
whether governing boards can contribute effectively towards addressing such challenges (Dearing, 1997; 
Shattock, 2002, 2004; Oxholm III, 2005; Browne, 2010; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013; Havergal, 2015a).  
Relatedly, governance arrangements in HEIs are traditionally seen to be a ‘shared’ one, usually 
involving close interactions among three main bodies, namely the governing council (the board), the 
senate (the academic arm), and the senior executive management team (primarily the vice-chancellor and 
his/her team) (Shattock, 1998, 1999; Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Toma, 2007). However, this 
governance model has been observed to under threat in the UK and elsewhere (Parker, 2011; Taylor, 
2013b). Based on the empirical results, our contention is that the impact of internal governance structures 
on voluntary disclosure may be enhanced when these governance structures are interacted rather than 
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being on their own. Thus, our third distinctive contribution to the literature lies in providing evidence 
supporting the moderating effect of internal governance mechanisms, and by extension the ‘shared’ 
governance model on voluntary disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses governance 
structures and reforms that have been pursued within the UK HE sector. The following sections present a 
multi-theoretical framework underpinning the study of voluntary disclosures, discuss the governance and 
voluntary disclosure literature, outline the research design, and present the empirical analyses, with the 
concluding remarks containing a summary and a discussion of the policy implications and wider 
considerations for the HEI sector.  
 
Governance structures and funding reforms within the UK HEI context 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that the UK has been at the forefront of HE sector policy 
reforms with particular focus on promoting sound financial management via good internal governance 
arrangements, greater public accountability and transparency, and stronger performance (Jones et al., 
2001; Oxholm III, 2005; Toma, 2007; Vidovich and Currie, 2011; Parker, 2012; Rowlands, 2013). In fact, 
there is a track record of extensive and sustained HE reforms in the UK, often engendered by New Public 
Management (NPM) discourses and/or central government funding cuts (Robins, 1963; Jarratt, 1985; 
ERA, 1988; FHEA, 1992; Nolan, 1995, 1996; Dearing, 1997; THEA, 1998; Lambert, 2003; HEA, 2004; 
Browne, 2010). However, until the 1900s, HEIs in the UK, especially universities had been considered 
autonomous liberal institutions whose primary aim had been the production and transmission of 
knowledge for ‘its own sake’ (Shattock, 1998, 1999; Middlehurst, 2004). Central to this liberal or 
traditional view is that unbridled university autonomy and academic freedom were fundamental to their 
capacity to produce, preserve and transmit knowledge and values on which civilised societies depended 
(Bennett, 2002; Shattock, 2002, 2004; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013). Thus, academic (‘professorial’) opinion 
was ‘supreme’ with UK HEIs being in the main able to successfully resist external economic, political 
and social pressures of the time (Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008). 
Consequently, HEIs internal governance arrangements were structured to ensure that the traditional view 
thrived. Specifically, HEIs were set up by royal charters with collegial or faculty governance structures 
(Trakman, 2008), in which academic authority was ‘supreme’, with senior academics taking strategic and 
operational decisions, as well as assuming leadership and management positions, including chairing every 
major committee (Sizer and Howells, 2000; Middlehurst, 2004). Whilst in theory, a two-tier governance 
structure, consisting of the senate formed entirely by academics, including the incumbent vice-chancellor 
with academic powers, and the governing council (court in Scotland), which included lay or independent 
governors with broad policy and administrative powers (Shattock, 2002, 2004), in practice, the council 
was largely a titular body whose function had been reduced effectively to that of an approval body 
(Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013). In effect, UK HEIs, especially 
universities were self-governing institutions, often espousing ‘academic democracy’[2] through collegial 
and senior faculty ‘shared’ governance model with limited external regulation and less demand for public 
accountability and transparency (Taylor, 2013b). 
The liberal concept of UK HEI governance went unchallenged until 1919 when the University 
Grants Committee (UGC) was established by the government with the power of determining and granting 
university status with direct administrative and financial oversight over HEIs through its research council 
(which later became funding councils) (Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002). However, tighter 
direct external control and state regulation did not start until the publication of the influential Robins 
Report on higher education in 1963 (Middlehurst, 2004;  Shattock, 2002, 2004; Kim, 2008). The Robins 
Report recommended substantial expansion of the HE sector by upgrading a large number of former 
technical institutes, further educational colleges, and vocational institutions into tertiary institutions or 
HEIs, with its suggestions arguably forming the main backbone for the development of the university 
sector till present  (Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Middlehurst, 
2013)[3]. In effect, the Robins report promoted a neo-liberal view of higher education as an alternative to 
the then dominant liberal ideology. Specifically, neo-liberalism emphasised learning for instrumental and 
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vocational purposes in contrast to the liberal view that focused mainly on the intrinsic value of learning 
(Sizer and Howells, 2000; Bennett, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013). Thus, the Robins report viewed 
education as an economic resource that needed to be exploited to support economic development. As such, 
it required a new kind of HEIs – polytechnics/colleges, which can provide vocational, professional and 
industrially relevant HE programmes, that were distinct from the academically oriented courses offered 
by their liberal counterparts (Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; 
Shattock, 2002, 2004; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013).  
 However, whilst the Robins Report had introduced economic instrumentalism and mass education 
into the UK HE sector, the polytechnics/colleges unlike their liberal university counterparts were still 
under the control of local councils. Therefore, their development was often impeded due to persistent 
bureaucratic and local political interference in their governance and administrative structures (Dearlove, 
2002). As a result, a new HE report, the Jarratt Report, which focused mainly on improving efficiency in 
universities, was published in 1985. Its recommendations were wide ranging, but the central thrust was 
that universities should be incorporated and run as normal profit-making business or commercial 
enterprises (Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013)[4]. With specific reference 
to internal governance arrangements, the Jarratt Report argued that the traditional two-tier governance 
structure of the liberal universities with excessive academic authority tended to be slow and bureaucratic 
in decision-making, inhibited innovation and enterprise and thus, was inefficient. The Jarratt Report, 
therefore, suggested that ‘new’ or ‘modern’ universities should be formed as public ‘corporations’ with a 
business-like looking unitary or one-tier governing board, consisting of a majority of ‘independent/co-
opted’ or ‘lay’ members (non-academics or outsiders)[5], who are severally and jointly responsible and 
accountable for the governance of their institutions (Sizer and Howells, 2000; Knight, 2002; Salter and 
Tapper, 2002; Hordern, 2013; Parry, 2013). Of particular interest, the Jarratt Report recommended that 
the governing board membership should not be less than 12, but not more than 25, including the vice-
chancellor, whose position and authority was elevated to that of a chief executive officer (CEO). 
Similarly, it suggested further that a majority of the independent members should have industrial or 
commercial experience with the work of the governing board supported by corporate-like looking sub-
committees, such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees. In effect, the Jarratt Report sought 
to weaken the influence of academics in university governance, whilst strengthening that of lay members, 
especially those with experience of running successful commercial enterprises. 
 The recommendations of the Jarratt Report, especially regarding incorporation and governance 
was passed into law in the form of the influential 1988 Educational Reform Act (ERA, 1988). The 1988 
ERA, therefore, effectively freed the polytechnics from local authority control by transferring their 
ownership from local educational authorities to higher education corporations. The members of the higher 
educational authorities constituted the board of governors, leading to a two-tier HEI system: polytechnics 
(‘corporations’) and universities (‘royal charters’) with differing governance arrangements. The ERA also 
created separate funding arrangements, with the polytechnics and colleges funded by the Polytechnics and 
Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) and the universities funded by the Universities Funding Council (CFC).  
The two-tier HE sector was further abolished by the 1992 Further and Higher Educational Act (FHEA, 
1992) primarily by: (i) merging the PCFC and CFC to form a single funding council for all HEIs, namely 
the Higher Education Funding Council in England (HEFCE) with its respective Northern Irish (DENI), 
Scottish (SHEFC) and Welsh (HEFCW) counterparts; and (ii) granting the polytechnics and some 
colleges a full ‘university status’.  
Although and arguably, these reforms had helped in making HEIs more responsive to the 
country’s economic needs by improving access, quality and efficiency (Bennet, 2002), it had equally led 
to rapid increases in the number of students in UK HEIs. For example, the number of 18 year olds 
entering HEIs increased sharply from about 8% in the 1960s to about 43% in the 2000s, which is a bit 
close to the UK’s government target of achieving 50% participation rate (Dearlove, 2002; Kim, 2008). 
However, mass higher education is expensive and hence, funding costs equally increased rapidly. For 
example, the proportion of public funding relative to  total university income increased rapidly from about 
33% in the 1930s to over 90% in the 1970s (Dearlove, 2002, p.259; Kim, 2008), although it reduced back 
to about 60% in the 2000s (Shattock, 2013). Thus, expanding access to HE with increasing public funding 
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has often stretched the UK government public budgets, especially in periods of economic difficulty. 
Consequently, achieving value-for-money through financial management and good governance in HEIs 
has been a high priority of almost every UK government with a number of reports being commissioned in 
the 1990s/2000s that have been aimed at reforming HE governance and funding. These reports include the 
1995/96 Nolan Report, 1997 Dearing Report, 2003 Lambert Report and 2010 Browne Report.  
Briefly, whilst the first Nolan Report in 1995 (‘committee on standards in public life’) generally 
highlighted seven main principles (selfless, integrity, objectivity, accountability, honesty, openness, and 
leadership) that should guide the conduct of public officers, including those governing HEIs, the second 
Nolan Report in 1996 focused specifically on governance structures in the ‘new’ (‘post-1992’) and ‘old’ 
(‘pre-1992’) universities, with its recommendations generally supporting the separate governance 
arrangements between the pre- and post-1992 universities (Dearlove, 2002). Similarly, the 1997 Dearing 
Report (‘national committee of inquiry into higher education’) focused on reforming governance and 
funding in the HE sector. With respect to governance, and unlike the 1996 Nolan’s Report, Dearing was 
more critical. In particular, it argued that the size of the governing boards of the pre-1992 universities, of 
about 34 on average, were too large and thus, recommended that it should be reduced to 25 to be in line 
with those of the post-1992 universities (Dearlove, 2002; Shattock, 2004). In addition, it proposed a code 
of governance for HEIs (although it did not formally include it in its final recommendations), which was 
heavily influenced by the recommendations that were contained in the 1992 Cadbury Report (Dearlove, 
2002; Shattock, 2004, 2013). With respect to funding, the Dearing Report recommended a fundamental 
change in tuition fees from being funded only by free government grants to a mixed system of 
government grants and student fees, supported by low interest government loans. This effectively ended 
the free higher education system in the UK, and thereby leading to dramatic declines in public funding of 
about 37% per student (Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008). 
Meanwhile the Committee of University Chairs (CUC), under the threat of government action, 
following a series of instances of poor governance in a number of post-1992 HEIs, issued its first 
voluntary code (‘guide’) of governance for HEIs in 1995 with subsequent revisions in 1998, 2000, 2004 
and 2009 (Shattock, 2004, 2013). Although the code was mainly targeted at the post-1992 universities, 
the CUC encouraged the pre-1992 universities to also follow the code, particularly with respect to the size 
of their governing boards. These developments also led to the publication of the 2003 Lambert Review, 
which focused primarily on examining business-university collaborations, but its remit also included 
governance. Unlike the 1997 Dearing Report, the 2003 Lambert Report formally included a code of 
governance for all HEIs to follow with financial penalties for non-compliance, including the pre-1992 
universities. The CUC incorporated Lambert’s Report recommendations into its current (2009) ‘guide for 
members of higher education governing bodies in the UK,[6]’ thus, effectively bringing the internal 
governance structures of the pre-1992 universities in line with those of the post-1992s. Furthermore, and 
following the 2007/2008 banking crisis that led to drastic cuts in the UK government budgets, the Browne 
Report, which focused on reforming higher education funding, including student finance was published in 
2010 (Melville-Ross, 2010; Taylor, 2013a). The Browne’s Report main recommendation has been the 
introduction of full tuition fees with a maximum cap of £9,000 and removal of controls/caps in terms of 
the number of students that UK HEIs can admit. It has also reformed the system of funding and loan 
repayment by replacing the funding council (HEFCE) with a new student loan company. In effect, the 
Browne’s Report has introduced a ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market (i.e., government still provides funds/loans 
to students via the student loan company, but students have the freedom to choose any university of their 
choice)’ economy in the HE sector with the aim of improving quality, but reducing costs by increasing 
direct competition among UK HEIs. In parallel, funding councils (such as the HEFCE) and other HE 
umbrella bodies have been highlighting the risks to financial sustainability (FSSG, 2011), the need to 
improve efficiency, effectiveness and value for money (UUK, 2011) and to develop/monitor/report 
organisational key performance indicators (CUC, 2006). In each case, governing boards are expected to 
pay greater attention to the assessment of these elements and to their reporting and communication to 
stakeholders. Relatedly, concerns about the wider accountability of the governing bodies were expressed 
in a review of Scottish HEI governance (von Prondzynski, 2012; Havergal, 2015a, b) leading to a 
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recommendation, amongst others, of including a key governing board objective aimed at “ensuring 
stakeholder participation and accounting to the wider society for institutional performance” (p.8, 2012).         
 These governance and funding reforms have gradually led to greater demand for public 
accountability, transparency and performance, mainly through increased external regulatory scrutiny and 
funding conditions, such as teaching quality inspections by the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher 
Education (QAA), the research assessment exercises [(e.g., the 2014 research excellence framework 
(REF)], and a range of performance/access data via the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA). 
Furthermore, the annual accountability return (which does include financial statements, risk management, 
sustainability, audit committee and governance reports) is an extensive reporting exercise aimed at 
satisfying the contractual conditions set between the relevant UK higher education funding body (England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and each HEI, but the reporting exercise is effectively a private 
communication between the parties. Finally, results from the National Student Survey (NSS), the 
Postgraduate Taught Experience Survey (PTES), and the Postgraduate Research Experience Survey 
(PRES) have been in operation since 2005, and 2009, respectively, and some of the data have been 
summarised in a Key Information Set (KIS) that is specifically aimed at helping students compare and 
contrast data and information on universities and their programmes. The results of these research and 
teaching assessments, and student surveys feed directly into national and international rankings of HEIs 
with serious implications for national and international institutional quality, reputation and 
competitiveness. It is in this rather competitive, complex and changing environment that we seek to study 
the extent to which HEIs’ annual reports provide information on its activities relating to teaching, 
research, administration, governance and relationships with its other stakeholders. The multiplicity of the 
audiences and their underlying rationales for relying on such disclosures leads us to consider the study 
from a multi-theoretical perspective.  
 
A multi-theoretical framework for voluntary disclosures in HEIs 
 
Firstly, it has to be acknowledged that the study of voluntary disclosure is an extensive area of the 
corporate accounting literature (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001; Samaha et al, 2015) and typically, voluntary 
disclosure refers to information “released to the outside, deriving from the management’s insider 
knowledge of the company, which are not required to be published in regulated reports” (Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013, p.187) and is as such a reporting initiative taken by management, whether at the executive 
or board level. An extensive part of this literature is concerned about the overall level of disclosure and 
the reasons underlying the differences in disclosure across firms and countries, and whilst some firm level 
factors (e.g., company size) are consistently found to be associated to disclosure, the results are more 
mixed when it comes to corporate governance factors (e.g., Samaha et al., 2015)[7] leading to unclear 
implications and policies for firms and countries engaged in corporate governance reforms.   Secondly 
and from a theoretical angle, the  agency  perspective is frequently put forward to explain why managers 
in a corporate for-profit context may be inclined to engage in a discretionary behaviour of disclosure (e.g., 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006a, b; Trabelsi et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008; Elsayed and 
Hoque, 2010; Broberg et al., 2010). Such approaches are consistent with a functional-led view of 
voluntary disclosures (whether social or financial in nature), whereby the information is conveyed 
primarily to assist users in making specific assessments and decisions (e.g., investing or divesting, 
monitoring managerial performance and actions, ensuring contractual commitment are met, and in 
assessing risk). In particular, agency theory posits that voluntary disclosures are a means to reduce 
information asymmetry between contractually-related partners. Relatedly, the influence and interaction of 
corporate governance (internal and/or external mechanisms) have also been considered in terms of 
whether they promote or impede the extent of voluntary disclosures (e.g., Lima et al., 2007; Rogers and 
Van Buskirk, 2009; Chau and Gray, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012, 2015), with mixed results and often 
inconsistent implications for any single main theoretical perspective, such as the dominant agency theory.  
Therefore, there has been a recent and gradual incorporation of a wider set of social-, political- and 
institutional-led motivations in the voluntary disclosure literature, which have either sought to 
complement or supersede the mainstream perspectives (Gray et al., 1995; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; 
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Chen and Roberts, 2010; Stubbs and Higgins, 2014). In particular, public accountability, legitimacy, 
resource dependence and stakeholder theories have emerged (e.g., Coy et al., 1997; Coy et al., 2001; 
Nelson et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Chen and Roberts, 2010; Kang and Gray, 2011). A common 
thread from such perspectives is that voluntary disclosures are seen to serve a broader and more complex 
purpose in the organisation’s interactions with its environment as opposed to a narrow, wealth 
maximising and rational actor logic underpinning the mainstream theoretical predictions. This resonates 
further when considering the case of non-profit organisations, a context where accountability for 
‘performance’ is inherently multi-faceted (i.e., towards beneficiaries, government, public, members, staff 
and funders) and not primarily driven, or measured, by financial distributions to providers of capital. The 
four perspectives are now briefly set out alongside a summary of existing studies on HEI voluntary 
disclosure. 
According to Coy et al. (2001, p.14), public accountability refers “to a public right to know about 
the condition and performance of the organization under the accountor’s charge”. The authors, drawing 
from the work of Normanton (1971), refer to an important distinction between ‘accountability’ and 
‘public accountability’ in that an accountability process (duty to account, and explain for, one’s actions) 
does not imply that the process will be visible to outside parties and tends  to involve pre-determined 
actors/parties, and thereby potentially excluding larger constituencies. Contrastingly, public 
accountability would by default be exercised in an open forum and organisations/managers would be 
expected to provide all information in the open and be available to public scrutiny. This is why the 
authors attach significant value to the role of the annual report in that it provides “a wide range of 
summarized, relevant information in a single document, which enables all stakeholders to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of a university’s objectives and performance in financial and non-financial 
terms. No other single source of such information is available to all stakeholders on a routine basis.” 
(p.14). Coy et al.’s (2001) also discuss of the importance of public accountability in the form of good 
stewardship of public institutions as a motivation for disclosure by HEIs. In this regard, public 
accountability through good stewardship arises from a public service ethos, whereby attempts to abuse 
delegated power are inherently curtailed and instead power is directed at achieving national objectives 
and protecting the public interests (Coy et al., 2001). In this case, public accountability in the form of 
good stewardship of public institutions is rights-based and not utilitarian in nature (Nelson et al., 2003). 
Hence, Coy et al. (2001) argue that fairness, accessibility and distribution are important concepts that 
should guide the development of a public accountability and disclosure model in HEIs. This would be 
consistent with the normative variant of stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Peston, 1995), which sets out 
that organisations, such as HEIs have to recognise the multiple expectations of its different stakeholders 
and that it is the HEIs’ duty to provide a full and transparent account of their activities to a wider audience. 
Since public sector HEIs have a vital mandate in society in terms of nurturing the knowledge and 
intellectual base, with a view to fostering social, economic, cultural, political, institutional and individual 
development, there is, therefore, a clear public interest in ensuring that HEIs operate in accordance with 
these normative goals, particularly in light of the contemporary threats associated with an overemphasis 
on managerialism, corporatisation and financial imperatives (Middlehurst, 2013; Parker, 2011), and the 
concept of public accountability is a key motivation underlying the need for voluntary disclosure that is of 
sufficient quality and quantity to enable the diverse ‘public’ audiences to hold HEI management to 
account in an open forum.  
However, the empirical evidence over the last two decades from England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (EWNI), New Zealand, Australia, Canada and United States (Gray and Haslam, 1990; Coy et al., 
1997; Banks et al., 1997; Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003) has indicated very varied levels, and 
changes in disclosure with wide variations in the types of disclosures. In particular, Banks et al. (1997) 
found that the sample of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (EWNI) universities had a significantly 
lower level of disclosure (about 42%) compared to their New Zealand (NZ) counterparts (about 95%) 
with very little change over time (1992 to 1994), whilst the sample of Canadian universities was the 
lowest performer with an average score of 25%.  It has to be noted that the sample of NZ and Canadian 
universities were rather small (7 and 16 respectively) relative to the EWNI ones (53 in 1992; 73 in 1994). 
Using a similar disclosure index, Nelson et al. (2003) found a significant increase in the voluntary 
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disclosure practices of 33 Canadian institutions from 1996 to 2000, albeit that the overall score in 2000 
was approximately 36%.  Gordon et al. (2002) surveyed 100 US colleges and universities and found an 
average disclosure level of about 31%. Finally, Coy and Dixon (2004) relied on the PAI to report a 
significant increase in the level of voluntary disclosure for a sample of 8 NZ universities over a 15 year 
period from an average of 10% in 1985 to 66% in 2000. With the exception of New Zealand, and with 
due consideration of the different disclosure indices used in these studies, the evidence points to a 
relatively low level of disclosure in spite of several instances of regulatory and governance reforms aimed 
at enhancing accountability and arguably one may question the extent to which a public accountability 
perspective can convincingly underpin the observed disclosure behavior. However, research gaps remain 
in that to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any study of UK HEIs following Gray and Haslam 
(1990) and Banks et al. (1997), particularly in light of the significant regulatory, governance and 
competitive factors faced by the sector.    
Interestingly, most of the studies do not explicitly consider the relevance of other theoretical 
perspectives in light of the empirical evidence. For instance, variability in the disclosure themes may 
point to the possibility of an instrumental form of stakeholder theory (Ullman, 1985; Roberts, 1992; 
Mitchell et al., 1997), whereby HEIs may strategically orient their voluntary disclosures to target and 
manage their most important stakeholder(s). For example, Nelson et al. (2003) analyses the disclosure 
trends in the case of Canadian universities and on the basis of interviews with HEI leaders, concludes that 
the enhanced level of disclosure was required to support fundraising and inform non-governmental 
funding sources. The stakeholder management concept also implies that some stakeholders may not be 
targeted in terms of annual report disclosures because they are seen to be less important or that other 
media of communication may be used. For instance, Banks et al.’s (1997) finding that EWNI universities 
do not provide a significant number of teaching- and student-related disclosures may be related to the 
possibility that HEIs were at the time funded by block grants from the government (and not directly by 
students and, as such students were not seen as key stakeholders) or that the accountability was otherwise 
made possible to the students via other means (e.g., via student union representatives). In particular, the 
insights from Mitchell et al. (1997)’s notion of stakeholder salience may prove to be more useful in that 
the authors assert that the organisation will prioritise (and thus for instance communicate more, and/or 
placate, using disclosures) stakeholders who are deemed to be powerful, legitimate and/or as a result of an 
urgent circumstance. In this regard, substantial public sector and HEI funding reforms which, for example, 
in the UK context, has enabled a higher level of competition (i.e., ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market’) between 
universities (for student places) may lead to a shift in the power, legitimacy and urgency of students and 
parents as key stakeholders relative to say, public funding agencies and research bodies. In a similar vein, 
concerns expressed by employers about employability and appropriate skills/knowledge of graduates may 
also lead to a shift in the salience of employers as more powerful, legitimate and ‘urgent’ stakeholders. In 
turn, voluntary disclosures may become one of the medium by which stakeholder management is 
achieved, although one of the main issues in the literature has been the difficulty to elaborate upon how 
disclosures do actually address stakeholder concerns.     
Whilst the stakeholder perspective places a great deal of emphasis on the identification and 
management of key interest groups, legitimacy theory provides a societal-led motivation for voluntary 
disclosure and are informed by the institutional perspective of organisational behaviour. Organisations, 
such as HEIs, can only survive or sustain themselves if their activities and objectives are supported by 
society and as such they are perceived to be legitimate [(i.e., “the organisation’s value systems are 
congruent with the values of the larger social system of which the entity is a part of” (Lindblom, 1994, 
p.2)]. Similarly, according to Suchman (1995, p.574), “legitimacy is a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. If the legitimacy of the organisation is 
threatened as a result of a particular event, it is argued that the organisation will adopt different strategies 
to restore its legitimacy and the communication of the activities and actions implemented thereof (e.g., 
using voluntary disclosures) is viewed as a central plank of the theory (Suchman, 1995; De Villiers and 
Van Staden, 2006; Soobaroyen and Ntim, 2013). In addition, voluntary disclosures can in themselves 
become desirable, in that they are proper and appropriate actions deemed to be ‘expected’ of a 
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‘professional and well-structured’ organisation. Within such a perspective, voluntary disclosures might 
well be ritualistic and symbolic in nature and, for example, may be the result of a response to a general 
change in public attitudes and of norms and beliefs towards HEIs. For example, after the introduction of 
‘quasi-market’ conditions in the HEI sector primarily in the form of full tuition fees and competition for 
students in the UK and a raft of other reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
HEIs activities (FSSG, 2011; UUK, 2011), an external discourse focused on issues of accountability and 
transparency can in itself lead to more disclosure primarily as an organisation perceives that such 
additional disclosure equates to ‘more accountability’ and is, therefore, in line with the socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs. Furthermore, Suchman (1995) refers to the process of 
‘strategic legitimacy’, where organisational decision-makers effectively ‘scan’ their environment and 
respond to legitimacy threats. According to Suchman (1995), different dynamics or ‘conduits’ exist by 
which organisational actors can manage their legitimacy (pragmatic, moral and cognitive). Pragmatic 
legitimacy (Soobaroyen and Ntim, 2013) can be seen as one that is achieved as a result of fulfilling direct 
exchanges (financial or otherwise) with immediate target audiences (e.g., funders, students, and 
employers).  
In contrast, moral legitimacy is not specifically aimed at a particular audience, but rather it is the 
result of the organisation visibly demonstrating an affiliation to moral values and beliefs. Suchman (1995) 
further breaks down moral legitimacy into consequential (meeting acceptable outputs), procedural 
(adoption of best practices) and structural forms (organisation has characteristics that are intrinsically 
worth of support). In this regard, non-profit and similar organisations, such as HEIs, exist in order to meet 
normative goals (e.g., education and research) and whilst they are subject to many attempts to be 
evaluated according to instrumental- and consequential-led measures (e.g., number of graduates, student 
employability ratios, national student survey, research or teaching excellence framework, and value of 
research funding). An HEI’s legitimacy is also assessed more broadly in terms of the practices it adopts 
(e.g., external examining, subject benchmarks, and research ethics) and also the fact that the HEIs have 
historically attracted support. Therefore, one expects that voluntary disclosures can be relied upon to 
communicate or reinforce the HEI’s multiplicity of outputs (consequences), best practices (procedural) 
and historicity (structural). Relatedly, Parker (2013), and to some extent Nagy and Robb (2008), provide 
an account of how HEIs globally, including those in the UK, have gradually internalised private-sector- 
and competitive-led practices in teaching and research activities, emphasising revenue generation, 
financial logics of efficiency, value for money, and quantitative-led management controls, such as key 
performance indicators. In so doing, they are responding to external expectations of ‘performance’, but at 
the same time, Parker (2013) suggests that universities, like companies, will also enhance their level of 
voluntary disclosure on a selective basis (e.g., refer to Coy and Pratt, 1998) to ensure that a good 
impression of their activities is communicated to the wider audience, albeit that information on such a 
basis may not be a comprehensive reflection of public accountability. Nonetheless, it is quite puzzling to 
note that the legitimacy motivation features rarely in the HEI voluntary disclosure literature. In their study 
of 44 Canadian HEIs, Maingot and Zeghal (2008) empirically test for the association between university 
mission/ objective, and size on the level of voluntary disclosure of performance indicators. It was found 
that that each of these variables was positively associated to the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
authors conclude that the findings are consistent with legitimacy theory. However, we would argue that 
their findings are limited given the univariate nature of the analysis, the exclusive focus on performance 
indicators, and other important variables, such as governance, have not been explicitly considered.       
The final theoretical perspective of interest is resource dependence, which is primarily concerned 
with the critical influence of external organisations on organisational behaviour and the power relations 
underlying the relationship between the different organisations. According to Pfeffer (1987), the basic 
premise of the theory is that the fundamental units for understanding inter-corporate relations and society 
are organisations. These organisations are not autonomous, but are rather constrained by a network of 
interdependencies with other organisations as they seek to access the relevant resources (e.g., financial, 
human resources, information, and legitimacy) to continue operating. In a context marred by uncertainty 
about the actions that may be taken by the government and regulatory authorities, organisations tend to 
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board members) to manage the interdependencies, but such actions are not always fully successful, 
leading to new patterns of dependencies and interdependencies. Over time, these changing patterns 
generate positions of power both within and outside the target organisation. In the context of the non-
profit literature (e.g., Callen et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011; Verschuere and De Corte, 2014), it is 
argued that resource dependence has provided a framework to model the behaviour of non-profit 
organisations in relation to its powerful resource-providers and in particular, various studies suggest that 
such organisations are prone to volatility in their access to resources and often depend on multiple sources 
to ensure they can continue to meet their objectives. As a result, organisations may be compelled to 
implement practices that are primarily for the benefit of the resources provided (e.g., Verbruggen et al., 
2011). In response to such circumstances, organisations do attempt to reduce uncertainties and resource 
shortages by maintaining autonomy, resisting pressures from, and/or managing their interdependencies 
with, external groups. Currently, UK public HEIs remain highly reliant on key resources for their survival 
(e.g., teaching income, international students, research income, enterprise activities, human capital, space, 
and reputation/rankings) and the resource dependence theoretical perspective either suggests that the 
external organisations, which control these resources can have power over the HEI and thereby pressure it 
to operate according to its expectations or that the HEI is able to resist this power and maintain an 
autonomy (Verschuere and De Corte, 2014).  
The relevance of resource dependence theory in accounting and voluntary disclosure is gradually 
emerging in the accounting literature, but its implications have mostly been considered in relation to the 
role of board and governance structures in influencing the level of disclosure in private profit-making 
organisations (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). In particular, one of the key strategies outlined in 
resource dependence theory to address power imbalances and uncertainties from the external environment 
is to tailor the organisation’s board composition to ensure a more stable control of the flow of resources 
for the organisation (Hillman et al., 2009). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, cited in Hillman et 
al., 2009), directors can bring four benefits to organisations: (i) information in the form of advice and 
counsel; (ii) access to channels of information between the firm and environmental contingencies; (iii) 
preferential access to resources; and (iv) legitimacy. Based on an extensive review of the literature, 
Hillman et al. (2009) conclude that these benefits brought to the board do flow to the organisations and, 
therefore, there is strong support for the continued practice of co-opting ‘resource-rich’ (Hillman et al., 
2009) directors - a practice we can anecdotally attest to in the case of the recent composition of UK HEI 
governing boards. In terms of the voluntary disclosure effects within an resource dependence theoretical 
perspective, the current conclusions and evidence seems to suggest that resource providers would respond 
positively to voluntary disclosure and improve organisational access to resources, in a similar vein to the 
stakeholder theoretical predictions (Chen and Roberts, 2010; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). However, 
one might argue that voluntary disclosure can also disrupt the delicate balance of the interdependencies 
between two organisations by revealing information that is crucial to one organisation and, therefore, lead 
to a power imbalance. Finally, the various insights by Parker (2002; 2011; 2012; 2013), Nagy and Robb 
(2008) and Taylor (2013a, b) also suggest that there has been a significant change in the way HEIs appear 
to have attempted to manage their dependencies and interdependencies in the wake of decreased public 
funding and regulatory reforms, and primarily have led to the adoption of practices and strategies to 
ensure an alignment to external expectations rather than reflect resistance or autonomy.  
In conclusion, public accountability, legitimacy, resource dependence, and stakeholder theories 
provide an overlapping theoretical framework to consider the extent and determinants of voluntary 
disclosures in UK HEIs. Given the broader social and political factors underpinning the activities of the 
UK HEI sector, we contend that the above-mentioned theories may offer a richer and more complex set of 
potential explanations for the cross-sectional differences in voluntary disclosure behavior.        
 
Governance and voluntary disclosure in HEIs: Prior empirical studies and hypotheses development 
 
Informed by insights from previous empirical studies on voluntary disclosure in HEIs (e.g., Gray 
and Haslam, 1990; Coy et al., 1991; Cutt et al., 1993; Coy et al., 1994, 1997; Dixon et al., 1991; Banks et 
al., 1997; Coy and Pratt, 1998; Coy et al., 2001; Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003; Coy and Dixon, 
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2004), general voluntary disclosure within the corporate sector (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Collett and 
Hrasky, 2005; Barako et al., 2006a, b; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Chau and Gray, 2010; Adelepo, 2011; 
Jetty and Beattie, 2012), internal governance (Carter et al., 2003; Gompers et al., 2003; Van der Walt and 
Ingley, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009; Bozec and Bozec, 
2012), and the UK HEI setting literature (e.g., Jarrat Report, 1985; Nolan Report, 1995, 1996; Dearing 
Report, 1997; Lambert Report, 2003; CUC, 1995, 1998, 2009; Schofield, 2009; Browne, 2010), we 
identified the potential antecedents of voluntary disclosures. Specifically, we examine how a number of 
internal governance mechanisms, including governing board size, independent governors, frequency of 
governing board meetings, governing board diversity, audit committee quality, the presence of a 
governance committee and audit firm quality/size impact on an HEI’s level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Governing board size (GBSIZE) and voluntary disclosure 
 
From a public accountability theoretical perspective, smaller governing boards are able to co-
ordinate and communicate better (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) and therefore 
may be more capable at protecting the public interest (public accountability) than larger boards (Coy et al., 
1997; Coy et al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2003; Coy and Dixon, 2004). By contrast, from a stakeholder 
theoretical point of view, larger governing boards may be advantageous in espousing corporate 
democracy in terms of being able to represent a wider group of key parties and actors interested in the 
activities of the company (stakeholder) (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984). Similarly, resource 
dependence theory suggests that larger boards are associated with increased pool of skills, experience and 
expertise, as well as greater connection with the external environment, including providing access to 
critical resources, such as capital, contacts and contracts (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Reverte, 2009). 
Arguably, the need to secure critical resources in supporting an HEI’s ability to maintain financial 
sustainability will be discernibly greater in the context of increased competition, public sector cuts and 
reforms. In addition, the structuring/composition of a board may also have a legitimating value 
(legitimacy) in terms of how the organisation structures its strategic leadership in accordance with societal 
expectations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). These multiple-theoretical perspectives pre-
suppose that a board’s ability to be effective in achieving these different roles depends on having a 
sufficient number of board members and in turn, one might expect that the extent of disclosure will be 
higher in response to the multiple demands, and roles expected, of board members.  
Within the mainstream empirical corporate governance and accounting literature, board size has 
been found to have a significant effect on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 
2006a, b; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), CG disclosure (Beeks and Brown, 
2006; Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012), SEA disclosure (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Michelon 
and Parbonetti, 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b),  and performance (Yermack, 1996; Cheng et al., 
2008; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009). However, the effect of board size on voluntary disclosure is not 
always positive. For example, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), Bassett et al. (2007) and Lindgreen et al. 
(2010) find no association between board size and voluntary disclosure, whilst Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a, b) do find evidence of a significant positive link between board size 
and SEA disclosure. One of the key issues underlying the absence of consistent results may be related to 
concerns expressed by both corporate (e.g., Higgs Report, 2003; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) and HEI 
sectors (Collis, 2004 in the United States; Lambert, 2003 and Buckland, 2004 in the UK) that board size 
has to be limited to an optimal or benchmark figure to prevent the emergence of an unwieldy and 
bureaucratic structure. The latter would be unable to operate effectively vis-a-vis the executive and 
reinforce the perception of a board being no more than a ‘talking shop’ with little ability to help 
coordinate and lead the organisation. In the case of the UK HEI sector, the CUC (2009) recommended a 
board size of between 12 and 25 members, suggesting that the Code considers size of the board to be 
relevant in terms of its effectiveness and ability to hold university executives to account. Noticeably, 
however, this benchmark is significantly higher than the corporate [(e.g., Lipton and Lorsch (1992), 
Jensen (1993), and Yermack (1996) suggest a board size greater than 10 does not generate incremental 
benefits)] and the US HEI sector [(e.g. Collis, (2004) suggested a ‘workable’ board of about 12 
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members)]. The extant UK survey evidence (CUC, 2006; Schofield, 2009)] suggests that whilst board 
size is on the decline primarily due to regulatory requirements, the average governing board size has 
remained high. Observably, there is acute lack of evidence on the impact of board size on voluntary 
disclosure in the HEI sector and thus, this provides good opportunities to contribute to the extant literature. 
The only exception is a US-based study by Gordon et al. (2002), which reports no significant association 
between governing board size and voluntary disclosure in a 1994 cross-sectional sample of 100 US HEIs, 
and thereby concluding that irrespective of size, “one or two powerful leaders [within the board] could 
radically change disclosure expectations” (2002, p.267). Due to the mixed theoretical and empirical 
evidence, as well as the generic suggestion that “…there is no preponderance of theory or empirical 
evidence to suggest a relation between board size and levels of voluntary disclosure” (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006, p.266), we hypothesise that governing board size will be related to voluntary disclosure, 
but we do not specify the direction of the coefficient as follows:                     
 
H1: There is a significant association between governing board size and extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
 
Independent governors (IGOV) and voluntary disclosure 
 
From a public accountability perspective (Coy et al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2003), the presence of 
independent or lay governors can enhance managerial monitoring and thereby help in improving public 
accountability and transparency. As a result, independent governors are in a position to influence a HEI’s 
voluntary disclosure regime since the governing board technically approves the annual reports and related 
voluntary disclosures. In contrast, it can be argued that disclosure and governance are inter-related control 
mechanisms and that the presence of independent governors may be sufficient to satisfy stakeholders 
(including funding councils) without the need for more disclosure. With the passage of time, disclosure 
items become accepted and entrenched within organisations and as a result, the role of the lay governor in 
influencing disclosure can diminish or become minimal. Thus, in the case of HEIs, voluntary disclosure 
has been primarily seen from a (normative) view of public accountability, where it is a duty of the 
organisation to provide information (Coy et al., 2001) so that its actions can be assessed and that abuse of 
power/authority can be curbed. Coy et al. (2001) mainly suggest a stakeholder approach to disclosure, 
where the HEI would provide a range of information of relevance to different interest groups. However, 
the authors implicitly rely on the management’s responsibility to be accountable and the use of 
appropriate standards and guidelines issued by regulators, and do not consider the potential circuit(s) by 
which this duty of accountability can actually be exercised.  
Similarly, legitimacy and stakeholder theories indicate that if a legitimacy gap exists between 
organisations and their stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), then one strategy might 
to appoint independent governors to symbolise openness and transparency. Thus, in an increasingly 
competitive, but information asymmetric ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market’ UK HE sector, better-governed HEIs 
may seek to distinguish themselves from their poorly-governed counterparts. One way by which an HEI 
can signal its good governance credential to its stakeholders is to appoint ‘respectable’ independent 
governors. Thus, lay governors represent different stakeholder interests and may seek to influence the 
organisation’s response, in terms of disclosure, to the demands and interests of these parties. In the same 
vein, resource dependence theory suggests that governing boards dominated by independent governors 
may increase access to critical resources, such as contacts, contracts, competences (e.g., legal and risk 
management expertise) and finance (Reverte, 2009; Schofield, 2009; Chen and Roberts, 2010). In other 
words, the resource dependence perspective implies that lay governors become important mechanisms by 
which information, networks and resources can be tapped and that voluntary disclosure may help reduce 
the uncertainties and power imbalances between HEIs and their external environment. Arguably, and 
given the increasing ‘marketisation’, competition, public funding constraints and reforms within the UK 
HE sector, the application of resource dependence theory is arguably particularly useful. For example, 
Buckland (2004) suggests that a political decision (reform) has been made to allow for the increase in 
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influence and presence of business and industry in the governance structures of UK HEIs, thereby 
reinforcing a resource dependence motive for the appointment of independent governors by UK HEIs. 
Within the UK HE setting, Shattock (2013) suggests that the Lambert Report’s (2003) 
recommendations on the need to strengthen HEI governing boards were heavily influenced by the 
corporate governance failures highlighted in the corporate sector and the resulting and gradual 
development of the UK Combined Code on CG between the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g., 1992 
Cadbury Report, 1995 Greenbury Report, 1998 Hampel Report, 1999 Turnbull Report, 2000 Combined 
Code, 2003 Higgs/Smith Report and 2003 Combined Code). Other than seeking to improve the level of 
monitoring and accountability of executives towards the board and the external stakeholders, the 
pronouncements in the HEI sector also placed greater emphasis on the governing board to be more 
involved in setting institutional direction, policy and strategy, including in relation to voluntary disclosure 
and transparency. The common and most critical element in ensuring a board can effectively monitor and 
lead at the strategic level resides in the appointment of independent or lay members of the governing body.  
With regards to the empirical literature on voluntary disclosure in the corporate sector, the 
specific role of the independent non-executive directors continues to be studied in different national 
contexts with positive evidence of the role of such directors in improving voluntary disclosure (e.g., Xiao 
et al., 2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013), corporate governance disclosure (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Samaha et 
al., 2012, 2015), SEA disclosure (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Fifka, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013a, b) and performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006a, b; Bozec and Bozec, 2012). To a 
lesser extent, evidence also emerges in terms of a lack of association (e.g., Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Lan 
et al., 2013) or even a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006a, b). With specific focus on the HE 
sector and to the best of our knowledge, no prior study has empirically tested the association between 
independent governors and the extent of voluntary disclosure and thus, offers important opportunity to 
make original contribution to the extant HEIs voluntary disclosure literature. Nevertheless, surveys by 
Nelson et al. (2003), CUC (2009), Maingot and Zeghal (2008) and Schofield (2009) suggest that it is 
likely that independent governors may play a role in voluntary disclosure decisions in HEIs. Also, the 
CUC 2009 governance guidance emphasises that the lay (independent) governors should represent at least 
50% of the number of governors for both Pre- and Post-92 institutions, implying that lay governors are 
deemed to be important actors in the HEI’s governance and decision-making structures and processes. 
Similarly, the changing and uncertain funding regime (Shattock, 2013), which has emerged after 2010 has 
arguably led to an awareness of a competitive and risky environment and that multiple sources of funding 
and support have to be considered, which can be enhanced through the appointment of respectable 
independent governors. Hence, the CUC 2009 guide views the presence of independent governors as a 
positive development, which may have a positive effect on voluntary disclosure. Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between lay (independent) governors and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Governing board meetings (GBMs) and voluntary disclosure 
 
From a public accountability viewpoint (Coy et al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2003), whilst board size 
and the composition of the governing board focus on the structural characteristics of the board and the 
profile of its members, the diligence of the board conveys the actual level of activity, monitoring quality 
and influence the governing board may have on organisational processes and outputs (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1992). In this respect, the number of meetings has been often relied on as a proxy for 
effective board of directors (Vefeas, 1999; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Carcello et al., 2002; Karamanou and 
Vefeas, 2005). From a resource dependence perspective, regular governing board meetings may be 
helpful in allowing governors to strategise, discuss, plan and assess executive performance, which may be 
particularly useful in a period of increased financial uncertainty, competition and reform. Similarly, 
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frequent board meetings may enhance stakeholder representation (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 
1984) and the legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) of the board by keeping governors 
informed and up-to-date about developments within the institution, which can help them to address 
emerging critical problems in a timely manner. By contrast, others (Jensen, 1993; Vefeas, 1999) have 
suggested that regular board meetings may have a negative effect in terms of executive time, travel 
arrangements and potential conflicts of opinions. Indeed, Jensen (1993) argues that an effective board can 
occasionally remain inactive. Instead he suggests that the board can be flexible, whereby the frequency of 
meetings can be increased in response to urgent developments (e.g., impending QAA audits, merger or 
hostile-takeover bid) and decreased when there are limited emergent issues to address.  
Empirically, the mainstream corporate governance literature indicates that the frequency of board 
meetings impacts positively on voluntary disclosure (Laksmana, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), audit 
fees (Carcello et al., 2002) and accuracy of earnings forecast (Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005), but 
negatively on performance (Vefeas, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). With regard to HEIs sector and to 
the best of our knowledge, there is no previous study examining the link between the frequency of 
governing board meetings and the extent of disclosure, and thus a golden opportunity to make original 
contribution to the extant voluntary disclosure literature. Discernibly, the CUC (2009) governance guide 
encourages governing boards to meet at least 4 times a year and thus, regular governing board meetings 
appears to be viewed as a positive development by the guide, which can impact positively on voluntary 
disclosure. Hence, informed by stakeholder, resource dependence and legitimacy theoretical perspectives, 
we hypothesise that:     
 
H3: There is a significant association between governing board meetings and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Governing boards’ membership diversity (GBDIV) and voluntary disclosure 
 
A relatively less researched, but emerging, aspect in the mainstream corporate governance 
literature relates to the organisational effects of the diversity (or lack thereof) of the governing board 
members in terms of observable (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender and nationality) and non-visible (e.g., 
experience, religion, education and professional occupation) characteristics that can impact on boardroom 
dynamics, decision-making and effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; 
Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). Public accountability theory (Jensen, 1993) 
predicts that greater monitoring and independence often associated with diverse boards can render them 
better at protecting the public interest than their homogenous counterparts (Coy et al., 2001; Nelson et al., 
2003). Similarly, resource dependence theory indicates that governing boards of diverse origins may be 
useful in connecting organisations to their external environment, including powerful stakeholders that 
may be helpful in attracting critical resources, as well as improving organisational image and legitimacy, 
particularly in a period of increased uncertainty. In fact, the need to maintain diversity in governing 
boards is of a particular importance within the UK HEIs sector and is stated in relevant rules. For example, 
the CUC (2009) guidance in relation to the composition of the governing board for both pre- and post-92 
institutions (2009, p. 41 & p. 45) explicitly provides that “…there should be a balance of skills and 
experience sufficient among members to enable the institution to meet its primary responsibilities and 
ensure stakeholder confidence” (p. 41) and that the appointed members should be “…people appearing to 
the appointing authority to have experience of, and to have shown capacity in, industrial, commercial or 
employment matters or the practice of any profession” (p. 45). The guidance therefore implies that a 
diverse board would be desirable and effective whilst leaving it to the institutions to decide how to 
achieve such diversity. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, both statements explicitly set out a 
resource dependence perspective in that it is expected that the HEI draws on resources from having access 
to individuals from different occupations and sections of society. HEIs are very much dependent on, and 
in many cases interdependent with, a variety of external organisations and institutions (e.g., government, 
student funding bodies, research councils, academic and funding regulators, HE access regulators, and 
companies) and a recognition of such interdependence may be reflected in the disclosures, particularly in 
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times of uncertainty and change, and having to satisfy multiple audiences. Furthermore, the reference to 
‘stakeholder confidence’ arguably underlies the need to manage the perceptions of multiple stakeholders 
and this can be achieved in terms of providing relevant disclosures. Due to the importance of gender and 
ethnic diversity, as well as being easily observable, we focus on gender and ethnicity aspects of the HEIs’ 
governing boards in terms of the number of women and ethnic minorities (Black, Asian and Ethnic 
Minorities – BAME) represented. 
Empirically, there is limited, but gradually increasing evidence on the effect of board diversity on 
a number of different organisational outcomes (Fifka, 2013). For example, the findings of past studies 
indicate that board diversity impacts positively on voluntary disclosure (Barako and Brown, 2008), 
performance (Carter et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015) and SEA disclosure (Fifka, 2013; 
Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). To the best of our knowledge, however, no study has examined the link 
between governing board diversity and voluntary disclosure within a HEI setting, and thus offers a good 
opportunity to contribute to the extant voluntary disclosure literature. Given the CUC (2009) Code’s 
explicit encouragement of diversity in governing boards, we will expect UK HEIs with higher levels of 
gender and ethnic diversity in their governing boards to put greater pressure (especially by the BAME 
members of the board) on university executives to commit to increased voluntary disclosure. 
Consequently, we hypothesise that:             
 
H4: There is a positive association between governing board diversity and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
The quality of board audit committee (QBACI) and voluntary disclosure 
 
The audit committee is a key corporate governance structure and has attracted a significant 
amount of attention in the mainstream literature (Bedard and Gendron, 2006; Jetty and Beattie, 2012; 
Ghafran and O’Sullivan, 2013). The main role of the audit committee is to provide a specialist oversight 
of accounting, auditing, reporting and risk practices/issues (and information generated thereof) within the 
organisation. In light of the fact that many corporate collapses and scandals were related to, or involved, 
accounting and auditing issues, the audit committee is viewed as an important public accountability and 
monitoring mechanism that is able to provide assurances as to the integrity of the information disclosed 
externally and of the relevant internal controls to the board and shareholders/stakeholders. The audit 
committee also liaises with, and relies upon, the external and internal auditor to ensure that issues are 
highlighted and management is made accountable for aspects relating to accounting, audit, disclosure, 
controls and risk. In this regard, a fairly extensive stream of studies has considered the effects of the 
existence, composition and diligence of the audit committee on organisational outcomes, such as audit 
quality, financial reporting quality (including earnings management), internal audit quality and investors’ 
perceptions.  
In relation to the case of voluntary disclosure, empirical studies (e.g., Mangena and Pike, 2005; 
Barako et al., 2006a, b; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) have found that the existence 
and/or composition of the audit committee (including the expertise of its members) have a positive impact 
on the level of voluntary disclosure. In the context of the UK HEI sector, the audit committee has not 
attracted a similar research attention although the relevant governance and audit committee guidance 
(CUC, 2008; 2009; Pearson, 2009) provides detailed information and prescriptions on the composition 
and operation of the audit committee. In particular, the relevant guidance (CUC, 2008 – ‘handbook for 
members of audit committees in HEIs’) expects, amongst other duties, that the audit committee should 
assess the clarity, completeness and transparency of the financial information and related voluntary 
disclosures and consider the voluntary disclosure practices of other institutions. One peculiarity of the UK 
HEI sector is that funding councils explicitly require the audit committee to provide assurances on the 
appropriateness of financial and control systems, risk management and the integrity of the information 
provided in the annual accountability returns to the funding councils, including the financial statements. 
Accordingly, the audit committee has to prepare its own annual report, which is approved by the 
governing board and submitted to the funding councils for scrutiny. This underlies the crucial role placed 
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upon audit committees of HEIs in ensuring that organisational accountability and transparency is 
maintained. Evidence on the audit committee activity remains scant, except for Dewing and Williams 
(1995) and CUC (2006). In particular, Dewing and Williams (1995) found that very few of the surveyed 
audit committees (10%) were concerned with external accountability, but given that the introduction of 
audit committees in the HE sector was at an early stage of development, the authors contended that audit 
committees may help in improving the level of accountability in the future. Thus, from a public 
accountability, stakeholder, resource dependence, and legitimacy perspectives, we hypothesise that the 
audit committee quality (in terms of composition, expertise, diligence, and monitoring capacity) will 
influence the level of voluntary disclosures:      
 
H5: There is a positive association between the audit committee quality and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
The presence of a governance committee (GCOM) and voluntary disclosures 
 
Whilst the CUC (2009) Code explicitly requires the establishment of audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees to monitor accounting, internal control, risk, appointment and remuneration 
issues, it does not require HEIs to set up a governance committee to closely monitor compliance with its 
governance recommendations contained in the guide. Consequently, we argue that HEIs that establish a 
governance committee to directly and continuously monitor their compliance with governance 
requirements contained in the guide on their own volition (i.e., voluntarily) are more likely to engage in 
good corporate practices and disclose more than those that do not have governance committees (Core, 
2001; Ntim et al., 2012). The relationship between the presence of a governance committee and voluntary 
disclosure is generally under-researched, and thus this renders it a fertile area for examination, especially 
in the case of HEIs. Empirically, and using 169 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006, Ntim et al. 
(2012) report that corporations that voluntarily establish a governance committee to monitor governance 
practices tend to disclose more information relating to their governance practices than those who do not 
have governance committees. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
 
H6: There is a positive association between the presence of a governance committee and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Audit firm quality (BIG4) and voluntary disclosure 
 
The quality, status and size of the external audit firm has been observed to be crucial factor in the 
corporate sector (e.g., Datar et al., 1991; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Wang et al., 2008; Adelopo, 
2011; Jetty and Beattie, 2012) because it signals the organisation’s willingness to be audited using more 
stringent standards and thereby this communicates a preference for high quality earnings information 
estimations and disclosures. From a public accountability perspective, the external auditor is a key 
monitoring mechanism, which seeks to alleviate agency costs and large audit firms have the power to 
self-select clients (Adelopo, 2011) and can impose changes in accounting and disclosure to maintain their 
reputation. With regards to the HEI context, recent evidence from a survey of audit fees in 113 
universities (Xue and O’Sullivan, 2013) reveals that 78% of the UK HEIs are audited by big four audit 
firms (i.e., Deloitte & Touché, Erns & Young, KPMG and PWC), with KPMG acting as the external 
auditor in 38% of the sample. This finding reflects a propensity for HEIs to appoint large and reputable 
audit firms and it is also noted that there is a significant correlation between the use of a big four audit 
firm and the so-called traditional universities (pre-92s). However, the consequences for public 
accountability are not explicitly considered in this audit fee study, whilst Gordon et al. (2002) do examine 
whether audit firm size (i.e., audit firm status: big six firms versus state auditors) does influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure by US colleges and universities. The findings show that almost all the surveyed 
private institutions (96%) rely on a big six audit firm, whilst only 57% of the public institutions have 
appointed a large private firm and most of the remaining institutions rely on state auditors. In the case of 
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public institutions, there was support for the hypothesis that universities with state auditors disclosed 
more than those audited by public accounting firms and in considering the full sample of private and 
public institutions, a lower level of disclosure was associated with universities audited by the big six audit 
firms. The authors interpret this result in light of the public accountability ethos orientation that are often 
inherent in terms of relationships with state-level rather than private sector auditors. In the UK context, 
external auditors have an explicit public accountability mandate towards the statutory funding bodies 
(Xue and O’Sullivan, 2013). Thus, they are otherwise not directly accountable to a ‘principal’ (i.e., a 
shareholder) as may often be the case within for-profit or private sector organisations, but rather to the 
governing board via the AC. However, and from a public accountability theoretical, external auditors, 
especially the big four audit firms have a public interest role to play and thus, it can be argued that UK 
HEIs audited by the big four audit firms may engage in increased voluntary disclosure than those that are 
not. Equally, from a legitimacy and resource dependence perspective, external auditors provide a ‘halo’ of 
transparency and accountability to their HEI clients which would, in turn, enhance their legitimacy and 
access to resources. However, the extent to which such actions would be reflected in terms of high 
voluntary disclosure remains to be examined. As a result, we contend that:         
 
H7: There is a significant association between audit firm quality and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Governance structures-voluntary disclosure nexus: The moderating effect of university executive team  
 
As previously explained, governance in UK HEIs is often a ‘shared’ arrangement among a 
number of bodies, namely the governing body/council (board of governors/court), senate (academic body), 
and vice-chancellery (vice-chancellor, deputy vice-chancellor/chief operating officer and the senior 
executive/management team – often, but not necessarily always, consisting of pro-vice chancellors, deans 
of faculties & schools, directors of services and the registrar/secretary) (Shattock, 1998, 1999; Sizer and 
Howells, 2000; Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004; 
Shattock, 2002, 2004; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Melville-Ross, 2010; Hordern, 2013; Taylor, 2013b). 
First, the governing board has the ultimate responsibility for all the affairs of the university, including 
governance, academic, risk, financial and non-financial matters. In the past, governing boards of UK 
HEIs were dominated by academics; recent reforms have increased independent governors’ membership, 
often with ‘commercial or industrial’ experience at the expense of academic membership (Bennett, 2002; 
Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Taylor, 2013b) - a practice which was initially adopted in the post-1992 
HEIs governance structures and more recently being diffused to the pre-1992 HEIs boards. As previously 
noted and in practice, financial leadership and governance, including auditing, financial reporting and risk 
management is mostly carried out through the audit committee of the governing board. Second, the vice-
chancellor (VC) is the CEO and is responsible for the management of the university. Similar to modern 
corporations, the VC manages the institution by appointing a senior or executive management team, 
including pro-VCs and/or directors for research and enterprise, teaching, finance, human resource, estates 
and registry. The VC and her/his management team are directly accountable to the governing board. Third, 
the senate is responsible for administering all academic affairs of the institution, including developing the 
curricula, promoting research and improving teaching quality. The senate is accountable to both the 
governing board and the university executive management team, especially the VC. Thus, in order to run 
an institution in the public interest, there exist apparent lines of accountabilities, responsibilities and 
interactions among these three bodies. With particular focus on financial reporting, accounting and 
auditing, a considerable amount of interaction typically occurs among the governing board (e.g., audit 
committee), the executive team (e.g., finance committee, finance director and secretary/registrar), internal 
and external auditors, and the senate (e.g., deputy VC, chief operating officers, pro-VCs for teaching and 
research). Therefore, we suggest that the extent and quality of voluntary disclosure may be influenced by 
the extent to which the university executive team is able to interact effectively with the governing board 
and the senate, akin to a collegial form of management predicated by Middlehurst (2013) and a shared 
governance model outlined by Taylor (2013b). In contrast, concerns by Taylor (2013b) and the critical 
 20 
 
 
reflections by Parker (2011; 2013) and Nagy and Robb (2008) imply that the managerialist and 
corporatist tendencies observed in HEIs (including the UK), such as the use of private-sector corporate 
governance models, may paradoxically lead to a form of ‘scientific management and governance’ 
reminiscent of Taylorist principles (Parker, 2011, p. 443). According to Parker (2011), this would be 
reflected into a centralised decision making process by the executive and a tendency to privilege narrow 
forms of accountability that are more restricted to the financial aspects or to the demands of powerful 
parties such as government and regulators, and thereby marginalising a broader form of voluntary 
disclosure to society and community. Thus, and arguably the higher (lower) the quality of interaction 
between the university executive team and governing board, the higher (lower) we will expect the 
voluntary disclosure to be. As a result, our final hypothesis is that: 
 
H8: The higher (lower) the university executive team interactive quality, the more (less) positive  
       (negative) is the link between the governance mechanisms and extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Research design 
 
Data considerations 
 
Our sample is based on the entire population of 164 UK HEIs, as at 31 December 2012.[8] As the 
results of previous studies indicate that HEI size tend to drive voluntary disclosures (Gray and Haslam, 
1990; Banks et al., 1997; Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003; Coy and Dixon, 2004; Maingot and 
Zeghal, 2008), we limited our sample to HEIs with a minimum total annual income of £5m. One hundred 
and thirty HEIs met this criterion, and thus represented our final sample used in conducting our 
quantitative analysis. Our sampling also took into account geographic/regional distribution (e.g., England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), as well as pre- and post-1992 compositions. In this case, the final 
sample of 130 is almost equally split, consisting of 66 post-1992 and 64 Pre-1992 HEIs. Overall, the 
sampled HEIs represented approximately 79% of the entire population of UK HEIs and represent a large 
sample relative to previous empirical work in the UK and elsewhere (e.g., Banks et al., 1997; Gordon et 
al., 2002). We collected two main types of secondary data relating to the: (i) internal governance and 
managerial structures, such as board and subcommittee characteristics; and (ii) public accountability and 
transparency index (PATI), which is our main proxy for voluntary disclosure. The internal governance, 
PATI and financial variables, were collected primarily from the sampled HEIs annual reports, which we 
downloaded from their various websites. This was, however, supplemented with other publicly available 
data sources, such as HEIs’ websites and other relevant reports.  
   
Definition of variables and model specification 
 
 We classify our variables used in testing H1 to H8 into four main types with the Appendix and 
Table I presenting how we measured each of them. First, our main dependent variable is the extent/level 
of voluntary disclosure (i.e., the PATI). We employ the widely applied content analysis method of 
codifying written ‘texts’, ‘numbers/tables’ and ‘graphs/pictures’ into various categories to collect all our 
voluntary disclosure data (Gray and Haslam, 1990; Dixon et al., 1991; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Banks 
et al., 1997; Unerman, 2000; Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008). 
Specifically, the PATI, which seeks to measure the quantity and quality of an HEI’s voluntary disclosures 
contains 57 items, consisting of 8 subsections: (i) overview of report (REP); (ii) overview of university 
(UNI); (iii) financials items (FIN); (iv) general services (GEN); (v) teaching services: process (TPRO); (vi) 
teaching services: output (TOUT); (vii) research services (RES); and (viii) community services (COM). 
As noted previously, the PATI is constructed based on a modified version [(i.e., in order to reflect the UK 
HEIs context, as well as Coy and Dixon (2004)’s original index, known as the public accountability index 
(PAI)]. To briefly explain, Coy and Dixon (2004) developed their PAI in the New Zealand HEIs setting 
by firstly carrying out a critical and in-depth construction of a voluntary disclosure index, particularly in 
relation to the use of dichotomous and un-weighted scores. They then identified a total of 130 voluntary 
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disclosure items of relevance to the HEI sector and surveyed by a way of a Delphi exercise, 39 HEI 
stakeholders (ranging from student representative, finance officers to governing board members) on the 
relative importance of these items. After several iterations, Coy and Dixon (2004) narrowed the index to a 
total of 58 items classified into 8 categories and a weighted approach was also implemented. Other than 
being used in the study of HEI voluntary disclosures, variants of Coy and Dixon’s (2004) approach have 
been applied in other settings, such as local authorities, schools and public museums (e.g., Tooley and 
Guthrie, 2007; Ling Wei et al., 2008). In light of the different UK regulatory context and the time period, 
we reviewed the voluntary disclosure items for a number of UK HEIs annual reports as a pilot and 
concluded that the majority of the items and headings were relevant to our study, except for the following 
changes. Firstly, the overview of the university (UNI) has two additional items (risk and key performance 
indicators; KPIs) to reflect the growing attention paid by UK HEIs on risk management and KPIs, as 
reflected by reports from the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (Schofield, 2009) and the CUC 
(2006). Secondly, we removed the items ‘achievements vs. objectives and targets’, ‘interpretive 
comment’ and ‘analysis of campus services’ since such narratives will be accounted for as part of the 
qualitative coding explained hereunder. Thirdly, ‘general services’ category (GEN) was reviewed to focus 
on students and resources information, whilst the staff-related items on training and health & safety were 
transferred to the community services heading (COM).  Overall, however, we contend that these changes 
are relatively minimal and do not preclude a meaningful comparison to studies relying on the PAI or close 
variants thereof. Lastly, each item is scored from a minimum of 0 (representing no disclosure in the 
annual report) to a maximum of 6 (representing detailed provision of a range of qualitative and 
quantitative information), giving a maximum potential score of 342 points (6 x 57, see Appendix for 
detailed provisions and scoring procedure). The respective HEIs actual score is then expressed as a 
percentage of the total potential score. This procedure is also followed for the sub-sections or the sub-
indices of the total PATI. Generally, and by construction, the PATI inherently seeks to measure both 
quality and quantity dimensions of HEIs voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the interpretation of our PATI is 
that the higher (lower) score, the higher (lower) the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosure and thus, 
the more ‘externally accountable and transparent’ an HEI will appear to be.  
 
Insert Table I about here 
 
 Second, we collected data on internal governance mechanisms, including governing board size 
(GBSIZE), independent or lay governors (IGOV), the frequency of governing board meetings (GBMS), 
governing board diversity (GBDIV), the quality of board audit committee index (QBACI), audit firm 
quality/size (BIG4) and the presence of a governance committee (GCOM). Third, as governance in the 
UK HEIs is currently still a shared arrangement between lay governors and academic executives 
(Shattock, 2002, 2004; Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; Taylor, 2013b), we 
create interaction variables between the governing board variables (GBSIZE, IGOV, GBMS, GBDIV, 
QBACI, BIG4, and GCOM) and the university executive team variables (university executive board size – 
ETSIZE, the frequency of university executive board meetings - EFMS, and university executive team 
diversity - ETDIV) to test for existence of potential interaction effect between the governing board and 
executive board variables on the extent of voluntary disclosure. Finally, to account for potential omitted 
variables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010), we 
include a number of control variables. These include financial performance (FINP), growth in total 
income (GROWTH), income from funding council (IFUND), HEI’s leverage (LEV), HEI’s age (LNAGE), 
HEI’s size (LNTA), HEI’s liquidity (LQUID), HEI’s risk (RISK), total endowment assets (TEA), vice-
chancellor’s gender (VCG), post 1992 dummy (P_1992) and Russell group dummy (RGROUP). For the 
sake of brevity, we do not articulate specific theoretical links between these control variables and our 
voluntary disclosure proxy (i.e., the PATI), but there is a rigorously established theoretical and empirical 
literature from the HEI or corporate sector which indicates that they can affect voluntary disclosure (Gray 
and Haslam, 1990; Coy et al., 1991; Cutt et al., 1993; Coy et al., 1994, 1997; Dixon et al., 1991; Banks et 
al., 1997; Coy and Pratt, 1998; Coy et al., 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Gordon et al., 2002; Eng and 
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Mak, 2003; Nelson et al., 2003; Barako et al., 2006a, b; Collett and Hrasky, 2005;  Kezar, 2006; Maingot 
and Zeghal, 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
 Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we begin our analyses by running cross-sectional 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Therefore, and assuming all the hypothesised associations are 
linear, our main OLS cross-sectional regression model to be estimated is specified as follows:    
                                 121710 i iiii iii CONTROLSGOVPATI                                                (1) 
where PATI is the public accountability and transparency index (PATI), GOV refers to the 7 internal 
governance variables, namely, governing board size (GBSIZE), independent governors (IGOV), governing 
board meeting frequency (GBMS), governing board diversity (GBDIV), quality of board audit committee 
index (QBACI), audit firm quality/size (BIG4), and the presence of a governance committee (GCOM), 
and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including financial performance (FINP), income growth 
(GROWTH), income from funding councils (IFUND), HEI’s leverage (LEV), HEI’s age (LNAGE), HEI’s 
size (LNTA), HEI’s liquidity (LQUID), HEI’s risk (RISK), total endowment amount (TEA), vice-
chancellor’s gender (VCG), post-1992 dummy (P_1992) and Russel Group dummy (RGROUP). 
We report the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate and multivariate 
regression analyses and robustness analyses in the following sections. 
 
 
Empirical findings and discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics, univariate and bivariate analyses 
 
 Panels A, B, and C of Table II present summary descriptive statistics to all, pre- and post-1992 
UK HEIs public accountability and transparency index (PATI), respectively, whilst Panel D of Table II 
report summary statistics relating to the control variables. Examination of the summary descriptive 
statistics reveals a number of interesting findings. First, in line with the findings of past studies (Gray and 
Haslam, 1990; Banks et al., 1997; Gordon et al., 2002; Coy and Dixon, 2004; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008), 
there is a large degree of variability in our summary voluntary disclosure (PATI) measure. For example, 
the PATI ranges from a minimum of 14.91% to a maximum of 78.36% with the average (median) HEI 
disclosing or scoring 44.02% (42.25%). Similar widespread distributions can be observed in the sub-
indices in Panel A of Table II, as well as those of the pre- and post-1992 HEIs presented in Panels B and 
C of the same table. For instance, voluntary disclosures relating to community services (COM) spans 
from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 83.33% with the median (average) HEI scoring 50% (51.08%). 
Observably, the lowest average voluntary disclosure relates to teaching services: output and outcomes 
(TOUT), whilst the highest relates to university overview (UNI).  
 
Insert Table II about here 
 
Second, a univariate test for significance of the mean and median indicates that the PATI scores 
of the pre-1992 (‘old’) and the post-1992 (‘new’) HEIs are not different from each other. This evidence 
offers support for the findings of Bank et al. (1997), which suggest lack of significant differences in 
voluntary disclosure behaviour between pre- and post-1992 UK HEIs. At the same time, there is evidence 
of significant differences in some of the sub-indices.  For example, pre-1992 HEIs discloses significantly 
more financial (FIN) and research (RES) information than their post-1992 counterparts. Third, the control 
variables in Panel D also exhibits similar wide spread in their distribution. For example, the oldest HEI is 
916 years, whilst the youngest is only a year old with the average (median UK HEI being 77.57 years, 
with age referring to the date on which an institution gained its degree awarding powers or university 
status. Noticeably, and on average, 83.85% of all vice-chancellors are males (VCG) with the small 
percentage of women vice-chancellors also mainly found in post-1992 HEIs. In short, pre-1992 
institutions appear to have significantly higher growth in income (GROWTH), larger in size (LNTA), older 
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in age (LNAGE), less geared in financing (LEV), and higher total endowment assets (TEA) than their post-
1992 counterparts. 
 
Insert Table III about here 
 
Third, Table IV reports descriptive statistics relating to the internal governance structures, which 
depict variability. For example, the average UK governing board (GBSIZE) has a membership of 24, 
ranging from a minimum of 14 to a maximum of 40 members. This is broadly in line with the 
recommendations contained in the 2009 CUC guide, which suggests that governing boards should 
between 12 and 25. Discernibly, our average governing board size of 24 is substantially higher than the 
mean of 15 members reported by Gordon et al. (2002) for a sample of 49 US government HEIs, but 
significantly lower than the average governing board size of 39 that they reported for a sample of 51 
private HEIs in the US. Comparatively, university executive size (ETSIZE) is smaller than governing 
boards with an average size of about 12 members. Consistent with the findings of surveys conducted by 
the CUC (2001, 2003, and 2006), Schofield (2009) and recent work (Goodall and Osterloh, 2015; 
Havergal, 2015b), representation of women (GBDIVG – 26.28%), and Black Asian and Ethnic Minorities 
(GBAME - 6.21%) on governing boards (GBDIV) are still relatively low at an average of 29.27%. 
Comparatively, however, governing boards are more diverse than university executive teams, with only 
an average of 18.67% women (ETDIVG – 10.24%), and Black, Asian and Ethnic Minorities (EBAME – 
1.35%). The noticeable findings suggesting low levels of gender and ethnic diversity within UK HEIs 
governing boards are roughly consistent with those reported by past studies (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Ntim, 
2015) that were conducted within profit-making public organisations. In line with the CUC’s 
recommendations, governing boards are dominated by lay or independent governors (IGOV) with an 
average of 54.92%, ranging from a minimum of 14.25% and a maximum of 93.75%. Similarly, the 
average governing board meets about 5 times (GBMS) in a year ranging from 3 to 10 times compared 
with the average university executive team that meets about 13 times, ranging from a minimum of 3 and a 
maximum of 48 times in a year. Further, and on average, 20% of HEIs have set up a separate governance 
committee (GCOM), whilst a clear majority of about 76% (increases to 88% in Pre-1992s, but decreases 
to 65% in Post-1992s) of HEIs is audited by a big four audit firm (BIG4), and thus offers support for the 
figure of 78% reported by Xue and O’Sullivan (2013) in a sample of 113 UK HEIs. 
 Finally, and although the summary descriptive statistics generally suggest convergence of internal 
governance structures between pre- and post-1992 HEIs, a comparison of differences in means and 
medians indicates some significant differences in a number of governance arrangements. For example, 
pre-1992 HEIs tend to have significantly larger governing boards (GBSIZE), lesser number of lay or 
independent governors, more likely to be audited by a big four audit firm (BIG4), but less likely to 
voluntarily set a governance committee (GCOM), and less diverse in terms of women (ETDVIG – 
university executive team gender diversity and GBDIVG – governing board gender diversity), and Black, 
Asian and Ethnic Minorities (EBAME – university executive team ethnic diversity and GBAME – 
governing board ethnic diversity) representation.   
 
Insert Table IV about here 
 
Table IV reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in our regression analysis to test for 
multicollinearity. As a robustness check, we report both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-
parametric coefficients and, observably, the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are generally 
similar, and thus, signaling the absence of any serious non-normality problems. In a similar vein, the 
bivariate correlations among the variables are fairly low, which suggests that any remaining 
multicollinearity problems do not appear to be statistically harmful. In addition, we investigated (for 
brevity not reported, but available upon request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, studentised residuals, 
Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics for homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and 
autocorrelation, respectively, with the tests signalling no serious violation of these linear assumptions.  
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Moreover, and similar to the findings previous studies (Banks et al., 1997; Gordon et al., 2002; 
Nelson et al., 2003; Coy and Dixon, 2004), Table IV reveals statistically significant associations among 
the internal governance variables, voluntary disclosure, and the control variables. For instance, consistent 
with our expectations, audit firm quality/size (BIG4), the presence of a governance committee (GCOM), 
governing board diversity on the basis of both gender (GBDIVG - females or women governors) and 
ethnicity (GBAME – Black, Asian and Ethnic Minority governors) (GBDIV), the percentage of 
independent or lay governors (IGOV), and the quality of board audit committee (QBACI) are statistically 
significant and positively associated with extent of voluntary disclosure (the PATI). By contrast, 
governing board size (GBSIZE), and the frequency governing board meetings (GBMS) are negative, but 
statistically insignificantly related to the PATI. Furthermore, the findings in Table IV suggest larger 
(LNTA), older (LNAGE), riskier (RISK) and financially sound (FINP) HEIs have significantly higher 
PATI scores. In contrast, we do not find evidence that the Russell Group of Universities (RGROUP), 
leverage (LEV), and the gender of the vice-chancellor (VCG) have any significant effect on the PATI. 
 
Multivariate regression analyses 
 
Table V reports the results of the OLS regression analysis of the impact of our seven internal 
governance mechanisms – the frequency of governing board meetings (GBMS), governing board diversity 
(GBDIV), governing board size (GBSIZE), independent governors (IGOV), audit firm quality/size (BIG4), 
governance committee (GCOM), and audit committee quality (QBACI) and twelve control variables – 
financial performance (FINP), income growth (GROWTH), funding council income (IFUND), HEI’s age 
(LNAGE), HEI’s leverage (LEV), HEI’s size (LNTA), HEI’s liquidity (LQUID), post-1992 dummy 
(P_1992), Russell Group dummy (RGROUP), and vice-chancellor’s gender (VCG) on PATI. Our findings 
generally indicate that some of our internal governance variables have the capacity to explain cross-
sectional differences in the PATI.  
First, the coefficients on independent governors (IGOV), governing board diversity (GBDIV), 
audit committee quality (QBACI), and governance committee (GCOM) in Model 1 of Table V are 
statistically significant and positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (the PATI), an 
indication that H2, H4, H5, and H6, respectively, have empirical support. By contrast, governing board 
size (GBSIZE), and governing board meetings frequency (GBMS) have a negative, but statistically 
insignificant relationship with the PATI, implying that H1 and H3 are not empirically supported. The 
former result is consistent with the finding in the US HEIs context (Gordon et al., 2002) and chimes with 
the assessment that board size in excess of 10 do not bring incremental benefits (e.g., Yemack, 1996). 
Also, and although audit firm quality/size (BIG4) is positively associated with PATI, it is statistically 
insignificant, implying that H7 is not empirically supported, as well as does not offer support for the 
significant negative finding of Gordon et al. (2002) in a sample of US HEIs. This may, however, reflect 
the different structure of the audit market at the time in the US (with a big six audit firms instead of big 
four audit firms) relative to the current context in the UK.    
The significantly positive association between independent governors (IGOV) and PATI provides 
empirical support for the results of prior studies in both the HEI (Gordon et al., 2002; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Maingot and Zeghal, 2008; Schofield, 2009) and the mainstream voluntary disclosure literature (Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Ntim et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2015) that suggest that having more independent governing 
board members tend to enhance voluntary disclosure. Theoretically, we suggest that this evidence offers 
empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from public 
accountability, legitimacy, stakeholder, and resource dependence theories. For example, from a public 
accountability and legitimacy perspectives, independent governors are mindful of the public interest and 
societal expectations, and thus appear to contribute to better communication and transparency, via the 
extent of voluntary reporting and disclosure  
Similarly, HEIs can show greater commitment to high levels of voluntary disclosure in order to 
signal congruence of their goals with the initiatives, values, norms, rules and regulations that emanate 
from powerful stakeholders (i.e., stakeholder theory) (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Gray et al., 1995; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), such as central 
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employers, government, parents, funding and research councils, and student and employee unions. One 
way of signalling such congruence and gain legitimacy from such influential stakeholders is to appoint 
more independent governors. Equally, voluntarily disclosing more information can offer access to crucial 
resources (i.e., resource dependence theory) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; 
Reverte, 2009), such as teaching and research funds from government, research and funding bodies, and 
students, by enhancing HEI legitimacy, public image and reputation.   
The positive link between governing board diversity (GDIV) and PATI provides empirical support 
for the findings of past studies that focused on financial performance and voluntary disclosure (Carter et 
al., 2003; Barako and Brown, 2008; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012), which suggest that 
corporate boards of diverse ethnic and gender origins are likely to show greater commitment to increased 
voluntary disclosures. Similarly, and jointly, our governing board diversity findings seem to provide high 
empirical support for legitimacy and stakeholder theoretical predictions. Specifically, they suggest that 
governing boards of diverse ethnic and gender origins may not only be able to improve public 
accountability and transparency disclosures by providing stronger links with internal and external 
stakeholders (i.e., stakeholder theory), but also provide access to crucial resources, such as research funds 
(i.e., resource dependence theory), and improve corporate legitimacy and reputation by signaling wider 
representation (i.e., legitimacy theory).  
 
Insert Table V about here 
 
The positive link between audit committee quality (QBACI) and PATI provides empirical support 
for the stakeholder management and resource dependence perspective. Specifically, the audit committee 
is a critical governance and accountability mechanism with power to discipline, as well as hold top 
management accountable and responsible, and which is tasked with reporting directly to funding councils 
(via the ‘audit committee annual report’). Therefore, increased independence, expertise and responsibility 
often associated with audit committee work, supported by an internal audit function, makes its members 
more predisposed to react directly to instrumental concerns (stakeholder and resource dependence) 
regarding voluntary disclosure, as well as able to recommend top management to engage in increased 
levels of voluntary disclosure. At the same time, the presence of a governance committee is significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure and arguably reflects public accountability and legitimacy motives in 
that its establishment signals a commitment to broader societal expectations about ‘good governance’ and 
the public interest. Overall, our evidence implies that HEIs with strong audit and governance committees, 
independent, and more diverse governing boards seem to be more ‘accountable’ and ‘transparent’ in the 
form of increased financial and non-financial voluntary disclosure.  
Discernibly, the statistically insignificant link between governing board size (GBSIZE) and PATI, 
governing board meetings frequency (GBMS) and PATI, and audit firm quality/size (BIG4) and PATI fail 
to offer empirical support for our multi-theoretical framework in the context of the HEI sector. In contrast, 
but in line with the evidence from the correlation matrix, the coefficients relating to the control variables 
in Model 1 of Table V suggest that larger (LNTA), riskier (RISK) and better performing (financial) (FINP) 
HEIs are more likely to make significantly more voluntary disclosures, whilst those experiencing faster 
growth in terms of total income (GROWTH) tend to make significantly less voluntary disclosures. Of 
particular interest was the result that HEIs with a higher variability in income tend to disclose more 
information. Theoretically, this implies that engaging in increased voluntary disclosures can be an 
effective means by which legitimacy may be maintained by gaining the support of powerful stakeholders, 
including offering critical resources, such as capital, contracts and contacts, especially in times of crisis 
when a HEI’s ability to exist and maintain sustainable operations is under threat.  
Second, our results so far indicate that cross-sectional variations in the PATI can largely be 
accounted for by some of our internal governance variables, but since the PATI incorporates voluntary 
disclosures from eight different sub-themes, it is possible for the relationship between each sub-theme and 
the internal governance variables to differ, with some potentially having strong relationships with the 
internal governance variables and others maintaining weak connections. Hence, to investigate the 
association between each sub-theme and the internal governance variables, we re-run equation (1) by 
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replacing the PATI with either the community services (COM), financial reporting (FIN), general services 
(GEN), report overview (REP), research (RES), teaching – output (TOUT), teaching – process (TPRO), or 
university overview (UNI) at a time, and the results are, respectively, reported in Models 2 to 9 of Table 
V. Noticeably, the coefficients on governing board diversity (GDIV), independent governors (IGOV), the 
presence of a governance committee (GCOM) and audit committee quality (QBACI) remain statistically 
significant and positively related to all eight voluntary disclosure sub-themes, whereas those on governing 
board meetings frequency (GBMS), governing board size (GBSIZE), and audit firm quality/size (BIG4) 
remain positive and statistically insignificant, providing additional empirical support for our previous 
findings.  
 
Robustness analyses 
 
We conduct a number of additional analyses in order to specifically test H8, but generally as well 
as to test the robustness of our results. First, as has been previously argued, the governance of HEIs has 
inherently been a ‘shared’ arrangement between a senior university management team and an externally 
dominated governing board, often involving close interactions among themselves (Bennett, 2002; 
Dearlove, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004;  Shattock, 2002, 2004; Kim, 2008; 
Trakman, 2008), although concerns as to changes in this arrangement to a more executive-led governance 
abound in the UK context and abroad (Nagy and Robb, 2008; Parker, 2011, 2003; Middlehurst, 2013; 
Taylor, 2013b). Therefore, our argument is that the role of the individual internal governance mechanisms 
on the extent of voluntary disclosure may be strengthened by interacting them with university executive 
management variables, namely university executive team size (ETSIZE), university executive team 
diversity (ETDIV), as measured by the number of women (ETDIVG) and non-whites – Black, Asian and 
Ethnic Minorities (EBAME), and the frequency of university executive team meetings (EFMS).  
The findings of our interaction analyses are reported in Models 1 to 7 of Table VI. Specifically, in 
Models 1 to 3 of Table VI, we interact each of the university executive variables (university executive 
team meetings - EFMS, university executive team diversity - ETDIV, and university executive team size - 
ETSIZE) with the seven internal governance variables (governing board meetings frequency - GBMS, 
governing board diversity - GBDIV, governing board size - GBSIZE, independent governors - IGOV, 
audit firm quality/size - BIG4, governance committee presence - GCOM, and audit committee quality - 
QBACI), respectively. In Models 4 and 5, we split university executive team diversity (ETDIV) into its 
two components of university executive team gender (ETDIVG) and ethnic (EBAME) diversity, and 
interact ETDIVG (Model 4) and EBAME (Model 5) with each of the seven internal governance variables. 
In Models 6 and 7, we interact the three university executive variables simultaneously with each of the 
seven internal governance variables, but we exclude governing board meetings frequency (GBMS), 
governing board size (GBSIZE), and audit firm quality/size (BIG4) in Model 6, as they are persistently 
insignificant. Statistically significant and positive coefficient on governing board diversity (GBDIV), 
independent governors (IGOV), governance committee presence (GCOM), and audit committee quality 
(QBACI) in Models 1 to 7 is discernible, whilst negative, but statistically insignificant coefficient on 
governing board meetings frequency (GBMS), governing board size (GBSIZE), and audit firm quality/size 
(BIG4) is noticeable. Observably, the interaction has strengthened the statistical power of our all our 
models. This new evidence implies that the university executive team variables have a moderating or 
interacting effect on the connection between the internal governance variables and the level of voluntary 
disclosure (the PATI), and thus H8 is empirically supported. It also means that our new evidence is robust 
to the existence of any potential interaction effects. 
Second, as Tables II and III show, UK HEIs differ in a number ways, such as financial 
performance, governance arrangements, age, risk levels, and financial structure, amongst others. This can 
lead to a situation in which our summary voluntary disclosure measure (the PATI) and the internal 
governance mechanisms may be jointly and dynamically influenced by unobserved HEI-specific 
differences, such as university executive talent, institutional culture, and HEI complexity (Gujarati, 2003; 
Guest, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010), which simple OLS estimations may be unable to identify (Petersen, 
2009; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). For example, there may arguably be cultural, institutional, managerial 
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and operational differences among ancient universities (e.g., Cambridge, Glasgow and Oxford), Russell 
Groups (e.g., Birmingham and Manchester) and post-1992 HEIs (e.g., Brighton and Huddersfield), which 
may impact differently on the level of voluntary disclosures. Thus, we estimate a fixed-effect regression 
with the aim of accounting for potential endogeneity problems that may arise from unobserved HEI-
specific differences. Thus, and assuming all the predicted associations are linear, we re-calculate equation 
(1) as a dummy variable fixed-effect regression specified as follows:    
                                 121710 i iiiii iii CONTROLSGOVPAT                                         (2) 
where everything is unchanged as specified in equation (1) except γ which refers to the HEI-specific 
fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of dummy variables to represent the sampled HEIs. Statistically 
significant and positive effect of governing board diversity (GDIV), independent governors (IGOV), 
governance committee presence (GCOM), and audit committee quality (QBACI) on the PATI, whilst 
negative, but statistically insignificant coefficient on governing board meetings frequency (GBMS), 
governing board size (GBSIZE), and audit firm quality/size (BIG4) is apparent in Model 8 of Table VI, 
and thereby indicating that our evidence appears to be not sensitive to the presence of any HEI-specific 
heterogeneities. 
Insert Table VI about here. 
 
Finally, and to control for potential endogeneities that may be due to important omitted variables, 
we use the popular instrumental variables (IV) methodology (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013b). However, to ensure that the IV methodology is appropriate (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006), we first 
execute Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test to test for the presence of an endogenous voluntary 
disclosure (the PATI)-internal governance (GOV) variables nexus. Applied to equation (1), the test is 
unable to accept the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and thus, we infer that the IV methodology may be 
suitable and that our prior OLS results may be spurious. The implementation of the IV methodology 
consists of two stages. In stage one, and based on the findings of the previous theoretical and empirical 
literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012), we conjecture that each of our seven internal governance variables will be determined by all the 
twelve control variables. In stage two, we use their predicted parts as instruments and re-estimate 
equation (1) as follows: 
                                       121710 ˆ i iiii iii CONTROLSGOVPATI                                         (3)           
where everything is unchanged as labeled in equation (1) except that we use the predicted parts from the 
first-stage regressions as instruments for the seven internal governance variables. The results presented in 
Model 9 of Table VI are mainly in line with those reported in Models 1 of Table VI, and hence indicating 
that our findings are insensitive to potential endogeneities that may come from omitting important 
variables. The minor upward adjustments in the magnitude of the coefficients on the internal governance 
variables in Model 9 of Table VI in comparison with those in Model 1 of Table VI is in the main 
consistent with previous findings, which suggest that instrumented parts of internal governance variables 
tend to predict voluntary disclosure more strongly than their un-instrumented parts (Beiner et al., 2006; 
Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Ntim et al., 2012). 
 
Overall discussion, implications and conclusions 
 
Internationally, the higher educational (HE) sector has and continues to experience rapid changes 
and/or reforms (Jones et al., 2001; Bennett, 2002; Knight, 2002; Salter, 2002; Oxholm III, 2005; Toma, 
2007; Hordern, 2013; Middlehurst, 2013; Taylor, 2013a,b). Specifically, the international HE 
environment has been characterised by large student numbers, low government funding often driven by 
public sector budget cuts, but tight control and regulation, high levels of national and international 
competition, more enlightened multiple stakeholders, and mass importation and application of neo-liberal 
economic ideas mainly in the form of new public management techniques into HEIs (Shattock, 1998, 
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1999; Dearlove, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004;  Kim, 2008; Trakman, 2008; Melville-Ross, 2010; Parker, 
2011; Parry, 2013; Rowlands, 2013). These changes and/reforms have brought greater emphasis on 
financial imperatives, the need for operational efficiency, strong internal governance, and heightened 
discourses of ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ (Hordern, 2013; Middlehurst, 2013; Parry, 2013; 
Rowlands, 2013; Taylor, 2013a, b). In particular, the implementation of the recommendations of the 2010 
Browne Report on UK HE funding precipitated largely by the 2007/2008 global banking crisis and 
subsequent deep cuts in HE sector funding in 2010 by the UK central government has led to concerns 
about financial sustainability, efficiency, effectiveness and competitiveness (UUK, 2011; HEFCE, 2011) 
This has motivated us to first consider how HEI voluntarily disclose information in their annual reports as 
a mechanism of external accountability and transparency, and secondly whether extant governance 
structures, borne out of several UK HE reforms, play a role in improving public accountability.  
 First, using a very recent dataset from 130 UK HEIs, we find that there is wide variability in the 
level of voluntary disclosures, but the overall score is 44.02% (42.25%) with limited differences between 
pre-1992 and post-1992 HEIs. Whilst we did not explicitly compare our summary voluntary disclosure 
measure (the public accountability and transparency index - PATI) level in 2012 to previous years, our 
reading of the evidence from the fairly dated UK studies (e.g., Gray and Haslam, 1990; Banks et al., 1997) 
shows very little improvement in the level of voluntary disclosures. For example, Banks et al. (1997) find 
that the disclosure level by a sample of HEIs (53, 59 and 79 institutions respectively) in 1992, 1993 and 
1994 remained almost stable at about 40% of the maximum disclosure score. A similar pattern, but 
marginally lower level of disclosure, is found for the case of Canadian institutions (Nelson et al., 2003) 
and US universities and colleges (Gordon et al., 2002), and the only exception has been the case of NZ 
universities (Coy and Dixon, 2004). The disclosure pattern on a sub-theme level is not overtly different 
although it is found that financial- and community-led disclosures achieve higher scores than teaching- 
and research-related ones. Several, and not necessarily competing explanations, can be put forward for the 
relatively low disclosure level and the apparent lack of change from previous studies. First, it may be 
argued that the 2010 reforms, whilst arguably having far reaching consequences compared to previous 
changes, had yet to have a full impact on university voluntary disclosure strategies in 2012. Thus, ours is 
a timely study examining voluntary disclosure behaviour of UK HEIs in the first year of implementing 
major changes/reforms to funding and hence, arguably relatively short for the anticipated major cultural 
shift in voluntary disclosure behaviour to be realised.  Second, the emphasis of our study on annual report 
disclosures does not consider the possibility that HEIs rely on other forms of public communication (e.g., 
websites; press releases; media coverage of teaching and research performance), which may have 
increased as a result of the contextual pressures, with an expectation of the latter having a greater impact 
and which may be more amenable to the dissemination of ‘good’ news outside of a formal accountability 
mechanism, such as the annual report. Third and although methodologically similar in orientation, the 
Coy and Dixon’s (2004) voluntary disclosure measure, which we adopted is slightly different in content 
compared with those used by prior UK studies and thus, not constituting a like-for-like comparison of 
voluntary disclosure levels. For example, the summary voluntary disclosure measure used by Banks et al. 
(1997, pp.216-217, 220) and Nelson et al. (2003, pp.84, 88, 92) consisted of 26 voluntary disclosure 
items compared with 58 in Coy and Dixon’s case (PAI) and 57 in our case (PATI). Thus, our PATI may 
not be necessarily capturing like-for-like improvements or changes in the levels of voluntary disclosures 
by UK HEIs in relation to those reported by prior UK studies. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the 
heavily regulated and funding context of the UK, whereby universities already provide information (often 
on a private or aggregated basis) to various agencies (HESA, funding councils – DENI, HEFCE, HEFCW 
& SHEFC,and grant agencies, fair access regulators, research panels, accreditation bodies) may have led 
to a situation, whereby the primacy of such stakeholders and resource providers is already addressed 
and/or managed using ‘privileged’ or ‘private’ forms of communication and accountability.[9] As a result, 
public and comprehensive displays of performance, actions and activities in the annual report are less 
emphasised, thereby plausibly leading to our results. One implication thereof is that Coy et al.’s (2001) 
expectation of “fairness, accessibility and distribution” (2011, p.26) germane to the authors’ concept of 
public accountability does not seem to be materialising, or at least improving, in the UK sector, and we 
would go as far as conjecture that similar patterns might be at play in other countries where the HEI 
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sector faces similar pressures (e.g., Australia, as per Nagy and Robb, 2008). As a consequence, and as 
predicted by Coy et al. (2001), ‘accountability’ to the few is heightened whilst the potential for open 
challenge on the basis of comprehensive ‘public accountability’ disclosure is limited and arguably may be 
contributing to the rise of, and a lack of resistance to, a corporatised university model. Drawing from 
Parker (2011), two additional implications can be related to the apparent focus on financial-led voluntary 
disclosures relative to other types of disclosures and the lack of significant differences between pre- and 
post-92 institutions. The former may signal the changing mission and strategy of universities towards 
commercialisation and corporatisation, whilst the latter may be symptomatic of a behaviour of 
homogeneity across HEIs to respond to similar coercive pressures from regulators and dominant funders. 
Informed by the above, we would also conclude that the instrumental motives of stakeholder and resource 
dependencies are more prevalent explanations of the current pattern of disclosures, compared to the 
seeking of legitimacy and public accountability to the broader social constituencies.   
Second, and in spite of the various governance reforms introduced in the UK HEI sector over the 
past 30 years (i.e., since the 1985 Jarrat Report), there has been virtually no detailed examination of the 
effectiveness of the governance reforms with the exception of anecdotal findings and discussions arising 
from the failure of specific governing boards to monitor or oversee HEI management. Yet, concerns about 
the effectiveness and impact of HEI governance work remain very topical (e.g., Schofield, 2009; 
Greatbatch, 2014). In this respect, our results bring much needed evidence on the contribution of 
governing bodies to the extent of voluntary disclosure. Specifically, we find that governing board 
diversity, independent or lay governors, the presence of a governance committee and audit committee 
quality are positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure. By contrast, we find that governing 
board size, the frequency of governing board meetings, and the audit firm size do not have any significant 
impact on voluntary disclosure. Since there are very few studies which explicitly examine the link 
between accountability disclosures, governance and other HEI characteristics, the scope for comparison is 
quite limited. Nonetheless, we concur with Gordon et al.’s (2002) results that audit firm size, board size 
and leverage have no significant impact on the extent of voluntary disclosures. One implication of this 
finding is a potentially inadequate policy on the reduction of board size in the current CUC guidance, with 
reported mean and median figures being still very close to the maximum threshold (i.e., 25 - a number 
that is considered to be very far from the normal expectations for an effective board in the corporate 
sector of 10). Such an unwieldy structure may potentially jeopardise the ability of a governing board to be 
sufficiently cohesive and decisive to have an influence or bearing on university management. 
Notwithstanding, the results on the significant positive variables collectively points out that the real 
emphasis needs to be on the composition, expertise, diversity and independence of the board which, at 
this stage, is not sufficiently outlined in the CUC code. As an illustration of the issue, it is probably telling 
that a recent consultation in Scotland on determining the structure of HEI governing boards (von 
Prondzynski, 2012; Havergal, 2015b) saw on one hand, broad support by HEIs for more women 
representation, but on the other hand, fierce resistance to the recommendation that the Chair (and 
staff/student members) be directly elected as opposed to being appointed. In effect, our results would 
support the latter recommendation in that currently HEIs with independent and more diverse governing 
boards tend, on average, to demonstrate more commitment towards public accountability and disclosure.  
Third, and distinctively, we find that university executive team structures have a significant 
moderating effect on the association between internal governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure. 
In particular, we find that university executive team size, the frequency of executive team meetings, and 
university executive team diversity strengthens internal governance-voluntary disclosure association. 
Thus, our finding offers support for the idea that HEI internal governance arrangements which emphasise 
a ‘shared’ leadership team, consisting of senior academic executives and governing boards dominated by 
externally appointed independent or lay governors (Shattock, 1998, 1999; Bennett, 2002; Dearlove, 2002; 
Knight, 2002; Salter and Tapper, 2002; Middlehurst, 2004, 2013; Taylor, 2013b). Conversely, the lack of 
a ‘shared’ form of governance, where either the executive management adopts a corporatised 
authoritarian style of decision-making (Parker, 2011) or where governing boards purely or primarily 
operate as monitoring mechanisms will not be associated with a higher level of voluntary disclosure. At a 
time when many commentators are highlighting the rise of the corporatised university (Middlehurst, 2013; 
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Nagy and Robb, 2008; Parker, 2013), and of its associated top-down ‘scientific management’ style 
(Parker, 2011), the interaction results suggest that a democratic form of governance may still be the most 
appropriate and effective way of achieving not only better accountability, but also better outcomes, both 
from a managerial and academic perspective. We, therefore, call for further research to examine more 
closely the determinants of HEI financial and non-financial performance, with an emphasis on the 
influence of governance arrangements and executive team characteristics such that an evidence can be 
obtained on the appropriateness and effectiveness, of private sector models of governance that have been 
employed in the HEI sector. In particular, future research can examine the extent to which the ‘shared’ 
governance model is able to resolve potential conflicts and maintain harmonious work relationships 
among governors, chair of governors and the vice-chancery that can result in improvement in trust, 
performance and reputation of the institution. 
 Fourth, our findings have important policy, practical, regulatory and theoretical implications. On 
the one hand, our evidence suggests that good internal governance structures tend to enhance 
accountability and transparency within HEIs, yet internal governance structures still differ substantially 
among UK HEIs. On the other hand, our evidence also shows the need to review some of the guidance in 
relation to governing board size, independence and diversity. Collectively, the study offers regulatory 
authorities, policy-makers, and stakeholders, such as the CUC, various funding agencies (i.e., DENI – 
Northern Ireland, HEFCE - England, HEFCW - Wales, and SHEFC - Scotland), the Leadership 
Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE), accountancy bodies, employee and student unions, and 
research funding councils a greater impetus to review, strengthen, monitor and enhance compliance with 
governance rules. With regards to voluntary disclosures, we would also suggest that appropriate sector-
based institutions, such as the British Universities Finance Directors Group (BUFDG), may consider 
developing voluntary disclosure guidance and seek regulatory backing for such guidance. Thus, from a 
policy and regulatory perspective, establishing a sector wide enforcement and compliance body that will 
specifically monitor the levels of compliance and disclosure of relevant governance and voluntary 
reporting requirements can be a step in the right direction. For governors, executives and managers of 
HEIs, our evidence suggests that there is the need for a major shift in their governance, reporting and 
voluntary disclosure practices. The introduction of full-tuition fees and the transfer of student funding 
from funding bodies (e.g., HEFCE) to the Students Loan Company (SLC), for example,  signals the 
emergence of new and powerful stakeholders (e.g., alumni, SLC, parents, prospective students and 
employers) who need to be equally carefully managed and satisfied in order for HEIs to maintain 
sustainable operations. Similarly, market-like conditions and direct competition has been introduced in 
the UK HEI sector with the removal of caps on the number of students that can be admitted by an HEI. 
Arguably, in this new competitive and market/quasi-market environment, accountability will need to be 
moved beyond private accountabilities (e.g., accountability returns) to traditional stakeholders, such as 
funding councils to broader public accountability to new and emerging equally powerful stakeholders, 
such as alumni, students and parents. One way by which such public accountability can be achieved is to 
produce comprehensive annual reports. Specifically, annual reports should not only contain 
comprehensive disclosures relating to the financial performance of the HEIs, but also important voluntary 
non-financial disclosures relating to a wide range of relevant issues, such as governance and risk 
management, teaching and research quality, career and employability prospects, alumni, accessibility and 
social mobility issues, human resource and intellectual capital, academic and international reputation, and 
social, environmental and community contributions, amongst others. From our multi-theoretical 
perspective, therefore, HEIs that will be able to commit to greater public accountability (public 
accountability theory) through increased voluntary disclosures may not only enhance their legitimate right 
to exist (legitimacy theory), but may gain the support of powerful stakeholder (stakeholder theory), such 
as alumni, communities, parents and students, who may offer them access to critical resources, such as 
capital (e.g., tuition fees), that are necessary for maintaining sustainable operations. 
Finally, our findings are robust across a raft of econometric models that adequately account for 
different types of endogeneities, as well as alternative internal governance and disclosure measures. Yet, 
its limitations need to be clearly acknowledged. As a result of the labour intensive nature of the data 
collection, our sample is limited to UK HEIs. Future studies may use a longitudinal dataset within a 
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country or cross-country context, which may arguably enhance the generalisability of their findings, and 
also consider more explicitly whether one theoretical perspective better explains voluntary disclosures 
relative to other theories. Similarly, due to data limitations, our analyses have focused mainly on internal 
governance structures. Future studies may improve their analysis by investigating how external 
governance mechanisms, such as external regulations (e.g., from funding and research agencies), central 
government policies, student and employee unions’ activism, economic factors, and competition drive 
voluntary public accountability disclosure practices. In addition, as we examine the introduction of a 
‘market or quasi-market’ HE sector in the UK in its first year of operation in which its full impact might 
not have been realised, future studies may provide new insights by re-examining our evidence and rely on 
our voluntary PATI-related disclosure models to enable comparisons over-time. Moreover and similar to 
all prior quantitative-oriented archival studies of this nature, our measures for governance and voluntary 
disclosures may or may not fully reflect how HEI executives, governors, academics, managers, regulators 
and funding bodies operate in practice, and thus our evidence of cross-sectional associations among 
governors, HEI executives and voluntary disclosure should be treated with some caution. In this case, 
future research may improve on our findings by conducting more in-depth analysis by, for example, 
interviewing HEI executives, governors, academics, students, funding and research bodies, internal and 
external auditors, regulators and policy-makers relating to governance, performance and public 
accountability issues.  
 
Notes 
 
1. We acknowledge that annual report disclosures represent only one mechanism of ‘formal’ public accountability and 
transparency and that HEIs communicate externally using a wide range of media. However, according to Coy et al. (2001), 
annual report information is an important mechanism enabling “open and on-going public scrutiny” (p.25, 2001) of the 
activities of the organisation. In addition, the contents of the annual report have to be formally reviewed and approved by the 
governing board and provides an opportunity to assess the degree of influence (if any) of governing structures on public 
accountability orientation of HEIs.   
2. Such ‘academic democracy’ was more evident within the internal governance structures of the elite Oxford and Cambridge 
(‘Oxbridge’) institutions. For example, within its royal charter, ‘Regent House’ is the central governing body of the 
University of Cambridge, made up of over 3,000 academics, university officers, and college fellows, who are equally 
responsible and accountable for its governance (Trakman, 2008). 
3. It should be noted that the implementation of the recommendations of the Robins Report effectively created a two-tier HE 
sector in the UK, consisting of: (i) a large number of newly established set of polytechnics or technical and vocational  
institutions; and (ii) a small number of old, but well established group of universities (Bennet, 2002; Kim, 2008; Holdern, 
2013). 
4. We note that this coincided with a period of large scale implementation of neo-liberal economic ideologies in the form of 
mass privatisation of state owned corporations, especially utilities, re-orgarnisation of inefficient essential public services, 
such as the national health service through the application of new public management techniques, and the emergence of 
public-private partnerships in the form of public finance initiatives, as way financing capital projects in the UK public sector 
(Bennet, 2002; Knight, 2002; Shattock, 2004; Middlehurst, 2004).  
5. Lay or independent or co-opted members imply that they “are not employees or students of the institution or elected 
members of any local authority, but persons with industrial, commercial or employment experience or the practice of any 
profession” (Dearlove, 2002, p.261).  
6. It should be noted that in July 2013, the ‘Scottish Code of Good HE Governance’ was issued by the Independent Steering 
Group appointed by the Scottish Government to be followed HEIs in Scotland. The Scottish Code took effect from August 
2013 with its content largely similar to those contained in the 2009 CUC Governance Guide although it observably places 
significant emphasis on the need to enhance diversity and in particular, gender diversity within governing boards of HEIs. 
Similarly, the 2009 CUC Governance Code has been revised and replaced with a new ‘Higher Education Code of 
Governance’ in December 2014. The governance arrangements contained in the 2014 Code are in the main similar to those 
contained in the 2009 Code, but some minor differences are discernible including: (i) the concept of ‘comply or explain’, 
which has been replaced with that of ‘apply or explain’; (ii) clear differences have been made in terms of governance 
arrangements that are mandatory and those that are voluntary; and (iii) the 2014 Code has been significantly shortened in 
terms of presentation with greater clarity with respect to the meanings and implications of principles, elements and 
governance arrangements.    
7. Although we explicitly draw insights from the general corporate voluntary disclosure literature (e.g., Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Barako et al., 2006a, b; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Broberg et al., 2010; Chau and Gray, 2010; Adelepo, 2011; Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013), especially in the next section (hypotheses development), we pay specific attention to voluntary disclosure 
studies that have been conducted within HEIs (e.g., Gray and Haslam, 1990; Dixon et al., 1991; Cutt et al., 1993; Banks et 
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al., 1997; Coy and Pratt, 1998; Coy et al., 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001; Coy and Dixon, 2004; Maingot and Zeghal, 2008), and 
thus permitting our analysis to be informed by both strands of the voluntary disclosure literature.   
8. We focus on 2012 because this was the first financial year following the introduction of the ‘market’ or ‘quasi-market’ in the 
HE sector primarily in the form full-tuition fees and removal of restrictions on the number of students that can be admitted 
by UK HEIs, which was driven mainly by significant central government budget cuts (i.e., public sector austerity). We argue 
that the introduction of market forces and competition directly brings to the core the importance of committing to greater 
public accountability and transparency in the form of increased disclosure by UK HEIs. Thus, this provides us with a unique 
opportunity to offer timely evidence on the internal governance-disclosure nexus. 
9. For example, the various reports and information contained in the annual accountability returns (i.e., audit committee report, 
risk management report, financial statements, and HR and employee reports relating to pay, equality and diversity,  and 
health and safety, amongst others) submitted to the UK funding councils can be technically subject to a Freedom of 
Information (FoI) request (and so is information held by individual HEIs), but it is reported that the current success rate for 
such requests is quite low (e.g., refer to Jump, 2014). In fact, in conducting our study, we sent a request to HEFCE for 
copies of the audit committee annual reports of HEIs to be supplied, but our request was turned down and instead advised to 
contact individual HEIs for copies of their audit committee annual reports. Although we did not follow our request up with a 
FoI request, it serves as an anecdotal evidence of the general difficult nature in accessing mandatory and voluntary 
accountability returns and disclosures relating to UK HEIs. 
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Appendix 
Public accountability and transparency index (PATI)  
Panel A: Public accountability and transparency index (PATI)
 Theme Item: Information on or reference to: Range of 
scores 
Total score 
per theme 
(i). Overview of 
report (REP) 
Auditors’ report (AUDR) 0-6  
 
30 
Statement of accounting policies (SOAP) 0-6 
Directory information (DINFO) 0-6 
Statement of managerial responsibility (SOMR) 0-6 
Brief summary (BSUM) 0-6 
(ii) Overview of 
university (UNI) 
Statement of objectives (SOB) 0-6  
 
42 
Risks identification, management and disclosures 
(RISKMD 
0-6 
Descriptive report/general operating review (DRGR)   
Financial review (FINR) 0-6
Key facts and figures (KFAF); 0-6 
Key performance indicators (KPIs)     0-6
Prospective information (PINFO) 0-6 
(iii) Financial 
items (FIN) 
Financial performance statement (FPS) 0-6  
 
 
 
 
 
66 
Statement of cash flows (SOCF) 0-6 
Statement of cost of services SOCS) 0-6
Financial position statement (FINPS) 0-6 
Budget information (BINFO) 0-6
Overhead allocation (OVAL) 0-6 
Depreciation (DEPN) 0-6
Financial ratios (FRAT) 0-6 
Investments (INVS) 0-6
Total value of estates (TVOE) 0-6 
Commitments and contingencies (CACO) 0-6
(iv) General 
services: Input 
(of students and 
resources) 
(GEN) 
Student numbers (SNOS) 0-6  
 
 
 
48 
Cost per equivalent full-time student (CEFTS) 0-6
Revenues (REVS) 0-6 
Staff (STAFF) 0-6
Measures on equity and access information (EGINFO) 0-6 
Qualification of student intake (QOSI) 0-6 
Space (SPACE) 0-6 
Financial aid (FAID) 0-6 
(v) Teaching 
services: Process 
(TPRO) 
Student: staff ratios (SSR) 0-6  
 
30 
Processes to ensure quality of teaching (PTEQT) 0-6 
Library service information (LSINFO) 0-6 
Computer service information (CSINFO) 0-6 
Fields of study (FSTUDY) 0-6 
(vi) Teaching 
services: 
Output/outcomes 
(TOUT) 
Graduates (GRADS) 0-6  
 
 
 
48 
Destination of students (DOSTDS) 0-6 
Departmental reviews (DEPTR) 0-6 
Pass and completion rates (PASSR) 0-6 
Student satisfaction (SSAT) 0-6 
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Employer satisfaction (ESAT) 0-6 
UG courses completed/100 EFTS (UGCC) 0-6 
Average time to complete programme (ATTCP) 0-6 
(vii) Research 
services (RES) 
Graduates pass and completion rates (GRDS) 0-6  
 
30 
 
 
 
Postgraduate students (PGS) 0-6 
Research income (RINCOME) 0-6 
Publications (PUBS) 0-6 
Destination of research graduates (DORSTDS) 0-6 
(viii) 
Community 
services (COM) 
Local community service (LCS) 0-6  
 
 
48 
Information on alumni activities, involvement and 
participation (ALUMNI) 
0-6 
National community service (NCS) 0-6 
International community service (ICS) 0-6 
Environmental related information (ERINFO) 0-6 
Employee health and safety related information 
(EHSINFO) 
0-6 
Equal employment opportunity information (EEOINFO) 0-6 
Staff training and development information (STDINFO) 0-6 
Total  57 Public accountability and transparency Index 
(PATI) Items 
 342 
Scoring procedure: PATI  
0:       No disclosure information 
1:       Disclosure focusing on only past information 
2:       Disclosure focusing on past/backward looking and future/forward looking information 
3:       Disclosure focusing on past, future and bad/negative news information 
4:       Disclosure focusing on past, future, bad and good/positive news information 
5:       Disclosure focusing on past, future, bad, good and qualitative/non-monetary information 
6:       Disclosure focusing on past, future, bad, good, qualitative and quantitative/monetary information 
Panel B: Quality of board audit committee (QBACI) 
 
 
The presence  of an  audit committee (ACOM) 0-1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
Composed by at least 3 independent members of the governing 
board, co-opted members with relevant expertise or interest 
who are not members of the governing board. (COM) 
0-1 
Chaired by an independent member (CHAIR) 0-1 
Disclosure of membership (DOM) 0-1 
Disclosure of meetings attendance record (DOMAR) 0-1 
Disclosure of the committee’s remit/terms of reference 
(DOCR) 
0-1 
Review of committee effectiveness & Performance (RCEP) 0-1 
Whether there sufficient internal controls are in place 
(INTERCON) 
0-1 
Arrangement relating to risk governance and disclosure 
(RISKGD) 
0-1 
Whether there is sufficient and well re-sourced internal audit 
unit (INAUDIT) 
0-1 
Statement on going concern status (GCS) 0-1 
Mix of skill and experience – whether at least one member has 
recent and relevant experience in finance, accounting or 
auditing. (FINLIT) 
0-1 
Frequency of committees meetings – if the committee meets at 
least 4 times in a year (FCMS) 
0-1 
Whether an academic (with or without accounting and finance 
experience) is present on the committee (NAFA)
0-1 
Total Quality of board audit committee index (QBACI) Items  14 
Scoring Procedure: QBACI 
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Binary/dichotomous: Zero for absence; 1 for presence. 
 
 
 
 
Table I 
Summary of measures and variables 
Public accountability and transparency index (PATI) – Dependent variables 
PATI is the total public accountability and transparency disclosures index containing 57 items based 8 main themes, 
including: 5 items on overview of report (REP); 7 items on overview of university (UNI); 11 financial (FIN) 
items; 8 items on general services (GEN); 5 items on teaching services regarding process (TPRO); 8 items on 
teaching services regarding output (TOUT)); 5 items on research services (RES); and 8 items on community 
services (COM). All 57 items have a score ranging from 0 to 6, resulting in a total potential score of 342; 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. Panel A of the Appendix contains the detailed 57 items and the 
scoring procedure. 
Internal governance variables – Independent variables 
BIG4  1, if an HEI is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,  
  and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
GCOM  1, if an HEI has set up a separate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
EFMS                     The frequency of university executive team meetings. 
ETDIV  Percentage of female (ETDIVG) and non-white university executive team members (Black, Asian and Ethnic 
Minorities - EBAME) to the total number of university executive team of an HEI. 
ETSIZE  Natural log of the total number of university executive team. 
GBMS  The frequency of governing board meetings. 
GBDIV Percentage of female (GDIVG) and non-white governors (Black Asian and Ethnic Minorities - GBAME) to 
the total number of governing board members of an HEI. 
GBSIZE  Natural log of the total number of governing board members. 
IGOV  Percentage of independent or lay governors to the total number of governing board members. 
QBACI Audit committee quality index containing 14 provisions obtained mainly from the 2009 CUC Guide that 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 14 audit committee quality provisions is disclosed in the annual report, 0 
otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These audit committee quality provisions are presented 
in Panel B of the Appendix.  
Interaction and instrumented variables 
I*BIG4 Interaction variable created by interacting the internal governance variable (BIG4) with each of the three 
university executive management team variables (i.e., EFMS, ETDIV, and ETSIZE). We also create similar 
interaction variables between the three university executive management team variables and the remaining 6 
internal governance variables (I*BIG4, I*GCOM, I*GBSIZE, I*IGOV, I*GBDIV, and I*QBACI), as part of 
our sensitivity analyses.  
Control variables 
FINP   Percentage of total annual financial surplus or deficit generated to total assets. 
GROWTH Percentage of current year’s total income minus previous year’s total income to previous year’s total income. 
IFUND  Percentage of total annual funding council income to total annual income. 
LNAGE         Natural log of an HEI age. It should be noted that age refers to the date on which the UK HEI gained its 
degree awarding powers or gained a university status. 
LEV   Percentage of total debt to total assets.  
LNTA  Natural log of total assets. 
LQUID  Percentage of net cash flows to total revenue. 
P_1992  1, if an HEI is post 1992 institution, 0 otherwise. 
RGROUP 1, if an HEI is a member of the Russell Group, 0 otherwise. 
RISK  Standard deviation of total income. 
TEA  Percentage of total endowment assets to total assets. 
VCG  1, if the vice-chancellor of an HEI is a male, 0 otherwise. 
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Table II 
Summary descriptive statistics of the accountability index and control variables for all 130 UK HEIs 
                        Pre-1992 –  Post-1992    
                                                                                                                                  ------------------------------------------ 
Variable                 Mean           Median            STD       Maximum         Minimum         Mean Diff.        Median Diff. 
Panel A: Public Accountability and Transparency Index Based on All 130 UK HEIs (%) 
PATI     44.02            42.25             12.57            78.36               14.91                0.94                   1.61    
COM                  51.08            50.00             18.13            83.33                 0.00               -1.25                    0.00                                      
FIN                         51.29            50.00             13.70            83.33               12.12                1.69†                   6.06*** 
GEN                  47.85            47.92             14.81            83.33                 8.33                0.25                    3.13**      
REP                        35.05            33.33             11.12            66.67               10.00               -0.30                    1.67**                           
RES                        41.36            43.33             16.53            80.00               10.00                4.00***                   3.34**                                    
TOUT                     27.48           24.07             14.58             77.78                 0.00                0.37                   -0.93                            
TPRO                     35.69           33.33              16.53            80.00                 0.00                1.61                      3.33** 
UNI                        55.27           57.14               14.62           83.33               16.67                1.70†                               1.19  
Panel B: Public accountability and transparency index based on 64 Pre-1992 UK HEIs (%) 
PATI    44.50        43.57               13.26            68.71                 14.91                  -                          -                                     
COM                 50.44           50.00               18.64            83.33                 14.91                  -                          - 
FIN                        52.15           53.03               14.29            80.30                 12.12                  -                          -       
GEN                 47.98           48.96               15.95            77.08                   8.33                  -                          -        
REP                       34.90           35.00               11.98            60.00                 10.00                  -                          - 
RES                       45.36           46.67               19.69            76.67                 10.00                  -                          -          
TOUT                    27.66           24.07               14.31            57.41                   1.85                  -                          -        
TPRO                    36.51           33.33               16.91            76.67                   6.67                   -                          - 
UNI                       56.14           58.33               14.96            83.33                 16.67                    -                         - 
Panel C: Public accountability and transparency index based on 66 Post-1992UK  HEIs (%) 
PATI   43.56           41.96                11.95           78.36                  21.93                    -                         -                   
COM                51.70           50.00                17.74            83.33                   0.00                     -                         - 
FIN                       50.46           46.97                13.16            83.33                 24.24                     -                         -                 
GEN                47.73           45.83                13.74            83.33                 14.58                     -                         -          
REP                      35.20           33.33                10.30            66.67                 20.00                     -                         -          
RES                      41.37           43.33                16.53            80.00                 10.00                     -                         -         
TOUT                   27.30           25.00                14.96           77.78                    0.00                     -                         -           
TPRO                   34.90            30.00               16.25            80.00                   6.67                      -                         - 
UNI                      54.44            57.14               14.14            83.33                 19.05                      -                         - 
Panel D: Control variables based on All 130 UK HEIs  
FINP (%)               2.76              2.34                 2.49              9.89                   -8.22                -1.36                              -1.19 
GROWTH (%)      1.86              0.73                 9.61          71.72                  -11.67                 2.68*                     3.08* 
IFUND (%)         33.48            33.65                 9.78            69.45          4.16                 -8.61***              -9.26***       
LEV (%)             44.70             43.55              16.50            92.88        10.48               -11.50***            -13.57*** 
LNAGE (years)  77.57             31.50            138.13       916.00                     1.00              123.45***                       69.00*** 
LNTA (£m)      361.76           246.01            457.26    3,540.00        12.92               285.65***           141.14*** 
LQUID (%)          0.97         0.40                 5.96            23.36                 -19.82                  -0.39                  -0.73                   
P_1992 (%)       50.77           100.00               50.19          100.00                     0.00                     -                         - 
RGROUP (%)    18.46       38.95                 0.00          100.00          0.00           -                         - 
TEA (%)          4.56               1.30                 7.82           57.24                     0.00                  6.08***                 4.66*** 
VCG (%)            83.85           100.00               36.95         100.00                     0.00                 -7.20***                   0.00 
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Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics relating to the public accountability and transparency index (PATI) and control variables, 
and their mean/median differences for pre- and post-1992 HEIs, respectively. ***, **,  *, and † denote mean/median difference between pre- and 
post-1992 HEIs for the respective is significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  Other variables are defined as follows: 
community services (COM); financial reporting (FIN); general services (GEN); report overview (REP); research (RES); teaching output (TOUT) 
& process (TPRO); university overview (UNI); financial performance (FINP); income growth (GROWTH); funding council income (IFUND); 
leverage (LEV); age (LNAGE); institutional size (LNTA); liquidity (LQUID); Post 1992 dummy (P_1992); Russel Group dummy (RGROUP); 
total endowment assets (TEA); and Vice-Chancellor gender (VCG) . Table I fully defines all the variables used.  
 
 
Table III 
Summary descriptive statistics of all internal governance variables for all 130 UK HEIs 
          PRE-1992  – Post-1992    
                                                                                                                                  ----------------------------------------- 
Variable                  Mean           Median         STD          Maximum         Minimum        Mean Diff.        Median Diff. 
Panel A: Internal Governance Variables Based on All 130 UK HEIs  
BIG4 (%)   75.97            100.64  42.89           100.00                  0.00                  22.88***             0.00 
GCOM (%)            20.77                0.00          40.72           100.00                  0.00                  -7.21***             0.00 
EBAME (%)           1.35                 0.00            3.43             21.97                  0.00                  -0.10                 0.00                
EFMS (no.)           13.10               12.00            7.32             48.00                  3.00                   1.00                 0.00              
ETDIV (%)           18.67               17.60            8.31             53.00                  0.00                  -8.93***                  -5.90***       
ETDIVG (%)        10.24                 9.90            4.10             41.00                  0.00                  -2.79†                 -0.96 
ETSIZE (no.)        12.42               11.00            5.94             34.00                  4.00                   1.78†                         2.50†                
GBAME (%)           6.21                 4.26            6.52            29.41                  0.00                    1.09                -0.76 
GBMS (no.)             4.96                5.00            1.36              10.00                3.00                     0.04                0.00              
GBDIV (%)           29.27              28.29          11.58              68.72                 4.76                    -4.41***             -4.76*** 
GBDIVG (%)        26.28              25.36          10.14              52.63                 4.76                    -4.31***            -2.57† 
GBSIZE (no.)        24.19               25.00            4.86              40.00               14.00                    3.90**               2.00†               
IGOV (%)              54.92               56.00         14.25              93.75               14.25                  -11.92***         10.00*** 
QBACI (%)           61.76               64.29          14.88            100.00               21.43                    3.35**               7.15** 
Panel B: Internal governance variables based on 64 Pre-1992 UK HEIs 
BIG4 (%)    87.50            100.00          33.33            100.00                 0.00                          -                     -        
GCOM (%)            18.75                0.00          39.40            100.00                 0.00                          -                     -      
EBAME (%)           1.29                 0.00           2.97               13.41                 0.00                          -                     -                 
EFMS (no.)           13.61               12.00           8.01               48.00                 3.00                          -                     -                         
ETDIV (%)           32.75               33.33         13.71               83.33                 4.17                          -                     - 
ETDIVG (%)          8.83                 9.47           4.20               16.09                 0.00                          -                     - 
ETSIZE (no.)        13.33               12.50           5.19               27.00                5.00                           -                     -                
GBAME (%)         26.93               26.24        12.14                59.09                4.76                           -                     - 
GBMS (no.)            4.98                  5.00          1.33               10.00                 3.00                           -                     -                 
GBDIV (%)           26.93               26.24        12.14               59.09                  4.76                          -                     - 
GBDIVG (%)        24.10               24.00        10.69               47.62                  4.76                           -                    - 
GBSIZE (no.)        26.17               25.00          4.75               40.00                15.00                           -                    -  
IGOV (%)             48.87               50.00         13.55              77.27                 14.71                           -                    - 
QBACI (%)           63.17               64.29        14.91             100.00                21.43                            -                    - 
Panel C: Internal governance variables based on 66 Post-1992 UK HEIs 
BIG4 (%)              64.62             100.00        48.19              100.00         0.00                            -                   -   
GCOM (%)           25.96                 0.00        44.06              100.00                  0.00                           -                   - 
EBAME (%)           1.40                 0.00          3.84                21.97                  0.00                            -                   - 
EFMS (no.)           12.61              12.00          6.60                48.00                  4.00               
ETDIV (%)           21.68               19.23        13.23                48.54                  4.86                            -                   -                                    
ETDIVG (%)        11.62               10.43        16.52                38.63                  0.00                            -                    - 
ETSIZE (no.)        11.55               10.00          6.50                34.00                  4.00                            -                    - 
GBAME (%)           5.67                 4.76         5.67                25.00                   0.00                            -                   - 
GBMS (no.)            4.94                 5.00          1.40                  9.00                   3.00                           -                   -                                    
GBDIV (%)          31.34                31.01       11.06                68.42                   4.76                           -                   - 
GBDIVG (%)       11.62               10.43        16.52                38.63                   0.00                            -                   - 
GBSIZE (no.)       22.27               23.00        14.00                34.00                   0.00                            -                   -              
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IGOV (%)            60.79                60.00        12.40               93.75                 29.63                             -                  - 
QBACI (%)  59.82               57.14        16.48              100.00                   0.00                            -                   -        
Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics for all internal governance variables, and mean/median differences for pre- and post-1992 
UK HEIs, respectively. ***, **,  *, and † denote mean/median difference between pre- and post-1992 HEIs is significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: audit firm size (BIG4); governance committee (GCOM); female (ETDIVG) and 
non-white ((EBAME) executives (ETDIV); frequency of executive team meetings (EFMs); executive team size (ETSIZE); 
frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); female (GDIVG) & non-white (GBAME) governors (GBDIV); governing board 
size (GBSIZE); independent governors (IGOV); and audit committee quality (QBACI). Table I fully defines all the variables used.  
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Table IV 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation matrices of the variables for all 130 UK HEIs 
Variable   PATI    BIG4      GCOM   EFMS   ETDIV   ETSIZE   GBMS   GBDIV  GBSIZE   IGOV  QBACI   FINP     LNAGE   LEV      LNTA  RGROUP   RISK       VCG 
PATI                  .246***   .467***    .115*      .107†       .106†         -.076       .125**     -.025           .127**   .174**     .262***    .088†     -.075       0.174***   .064           .200***      .046  
 
BIG4     .228***                  .122***    .063       -.003       .002          .093**    -.034      .243***   .319***    .178**   -.198***    .279***    .247***    .326***   .222***     .198***    -.002                      
 
GCOM       .422***    .201**                     -.056       -.045      .043          .000       -.144**   -.118        .137***    .106†      .079       -.018      -.009   -.043      -.097       -.028          .173*** 
  
EFMS        .133***   -.014     -.055
 
     
 
            .115*       .063          -.056        .001      -.043      .072        .067        .086        .012         .006         .069       .197***    .034          .006 
        
ETDIV       .111*       -.107†  .005      -.057             .107†       -.003       .045       -.001     -.183***    .222***    -.017       .092*        .110†       -.087    -.021        .014         -.192***         
         
 
ETSIZE     .046        .074       .0051    -.051       .078                           .106†       .002       .009       .043       -.043      -.083        .196***     -.072        .158***   .204***     .100        .078 
 
GBMS       -.001        .044      .017      -.096     -.004       .109***                  .050        .048     -.067       -.023       .032          .037        .001        -.137**     .101†       .052        -.151** 
 
GBDIV      .179***   -.019       .140**   .103     .123***   .198***     .061                             .120**   .025        -.117*     .192**       -.152**    -.015       -.038      -.020      -.176***     -.053 
 
GBSIZE    -.080        .245*** -.121*    -.054     -.095*     .010         .073*
 
      .282***                       .051       -.016      -.142**    .316***     .015         .123***     .190***   .077         .025        
 
IGOV         .236***   .353***     .131**    .151       .005      .046        -.062       -.008       .093**                       .242***    .143**    -.420***   .112†       -.266***     .241***   .126***     .148***   
 
QBACI      .134***   -.078      .070        .090       .092      .008         -.043        .111***   -.058       .090**                    .050        .059         .025         .012        .081         .090         .037 
 
FINP        .289***    -.265***   .128**      .041      .449***  .069*         .098**    -.027       .197***     .076    .047                         -.257***    -.145***    -.168***    .009       -.596***      115***   
 
LNAGE    .107*     .289***    -.053       -.078      .079*     .157***       .100**     .008     .083     .054   .009      .267***              -.465***     -.625***   .506***    .201        .052 
 
LEV        .086       .244***    -.011      -.084      .008      .131***      .036       -.085**   .041      .052        .071**    .161***        .310***                         .283†     -.315***   .036          -.069 
 
LNTA      .198***   .351***   .084        .165**   -.090**  -.131***     -.093   -.011       -.009      -.063      -.145***  -.65   .027       .015                                        .660***   .105†         .029 
 
RGROUP .086      .222***      .119†   -.186***  .053         .009         .006       .070     .008        .022      -.063     .070*     .015      .025     -.219***                                           .048        .101†    
 
RISK       .192***   .284***     -.048     -.018     .068      .010         .169***   -.116***  .104***    .032    -.049      .143      .063       .025     -.037     -.235***                                         -.006              
 
VCG       .031      .002            .097   -.056    .034       .058      .070      -.044     .020       .133***    .030     .112***   .043     .036        -.023         .168***   .116*** 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, 
**,
 
* and † denote correlation is significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: public accountability and transparency index (PATI); 
audit firm size (BIG4); governance committee (GCOM); frequency of university executive team meetings (EFMs); female and non-white executives (ETDIV); university executive team 
size (ETSIZE); frequency of governing board meetings (GBMs); female and non-white governors (GBDIV); governing board size (GBSIZE); independent governors (IGOV); audit 
committee quality (QBACI); financial performance (FINP); age (LNAGE); leverage (LEV); size (LNTA); Russel Group dummy (RGROUP); risk (RISK); and Vice-Chancellor gender (VCG). Table I 
fully defines all the variables used.  
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Table V 
Effects of internal governance structures on public accountability and transparency disclosures 
Dependent variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. variables    PATI          COM          FIN          GEN             REP            RES        TOUT         TPRO           UNI 
(Model)                   (1)               (2)             (3)              (4)               (5)               (6)             (7)              (8)                (9) 
Governing board characteristics: 
   GBMS             -0.366     -0.088          -0.075         -0.369       -0.348          -0.250        -0.143        -0.060          -0.054 
              (0.640)     (0.942)        (0.933)        (0.695)      (0.651)        (0.576)       (0.708)    (0.940)       (0.806)     
   GBDIV            .210**           0.149†          0.180†          0.272***     0.200***       0.168†        0.158**       0.223***       0.196*** 
                          (0.017)         (0.068)        (0.069)        (0.010)       (0.011)        (0.055)      (0.036)        (0.010)      (0.008) 
   GBSIZE         -0.183           -0.066          -0.293         -0.320         -0.304         -0.360        -0.370         -0.346       -0.350   
                          (0.453)         (0.860)        (0.290)        (0.278)       (0.631)        (0.203)      (0.262)       (0.268)       (0.243) 
   IGOV             0.145†            0.188†         0.146†         0.172†        0.132†           0.160†       0.154†        0.142†          0.175† 
                         (0.092)          (0.055)        (0.062)        (0.094)       (0.083)        (0.095)       (0.073)       (0.079)       (0.063) 
Accounting/audit/governance committees:  
   BIG4               2.404      3.979           0.824          0.517          2.495           2.230   2.270         2.295         1.345 
             (0.351)     (0.318)        (0.777)        (0.868)      (0.325)        (0.334) (0.309)     (0.298)      (0.601) 
   GCOM          15.108***       19.247***    13.665***      14.559***     12.833***       13.030         14.142***   15.150***   13.140*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)     (0.000) 
   QBACI            0.173†           0.139†        0.168†          0.144†         0.178†        0.123†          0.128†       0.180†      0.152† 
                          (0.053)          (0.087)       (0.055)        (0.068)        (0.054)       (0.094)        (0.090)      (0.051)      (0.058) 
Control variables:  
    FINP              1.092†           1.022†         1.149†           1.147**        1.118†        1.215*           1.274†       1.208†       1.306† 
            (0.061)         (0.053)        (0.081)        (0.037)        (0.090)        (0.050)         (0.087)    (0.074)       (0.068) 
   GROWTH     -0.580***      -0.404**       -0.302**        -0.439**       -0.440**      -0.306**        -0.425**     -0.460**    -0.452** 
                          (0.010)        (0.043)         (0.050)       (0.030)        (0.050)        (0.048)        (0.036)       (0.023)      (0.027) 
   IFUND            -0.160          -0.117          -0.321†        -0.175          -0.186         -0.160         -0.210         -0.184       -0.153 
             (0.000)        (0.614)        (0.060)        (0.333)       (0.285)         (0.296)       (0.268)      (0.289)      (0.375) 
   LNAGE         -0.360            -0.398           -0.051        -1.182          -0.632         -1.195 -0.665       -1.132         -0.763 
            (0.829)         (0.877)        (0.978)        (0.557)       (0.486)        (0.497)        (0.480)     (0.463)       (0.690) 
   LEV               -0.047           -0.076         -0.050          0.056         -0.088       -0.075           -0.098         -0.070        -0.085 
                         (0.533)         (0.514)        (0.558)        (0.554)        (0.435)       (0.462)        (0.405)       (0.457)       (0.428) 
   LNTA           1.947**           3.410***      1.276**         4.120***       3.363***       4.320***      3.436***       3.218***     4.249*** 
                         (0.045)         (0.000)        (0.040)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)      (0.000) 
   LQUID          -0.160        -0.210            -0.317†       -0.250          -0.283        -0.246            -0.223          -0.280       -0.263 
                         (0.285)        (0.417)         (0.096)       (0.216)        (0.198)       (0.275)         (0.296)        (0.305)       (0.398) 
   P_1992         -2.422          -1.278           -1.379        -6.212          -1.065         -2.027          -1.020         -1.067        -2.046 
                         (0.512)        (0.961)         (0.928)       (0.165)        (0.178)       (0.129)         (0.692)       (0.474)        (0.380) 
   RGROUP      2.192           6.012            3.680         -1.296          -1.031       -1.050           -1.049          -1.057        -1.045 
                         (0.740)        (0.252)        (0.339)       (0.842)        (0.962)        (0.941)         (0.963)        (0.919)       (0.986) 
  RISK               0.933***       0.719***        0.808***     0.882***        0.731***      0.950***         0.949***       0.857***      0.845*** 
                         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000) 
  VCG              -2.394          -3.853          -2.972       -3.716           -3.031         -3.050          -3.049          -3.057        -3.045 
                         (0.740)        (0.459)        (0.510)       (0.278)        (0.462)        (0.241)         (0.363)        (0.219)       (0.296) 
Constant         14.702         25.772           18.886       22.742            5.157         23.962        21.420           82.277      18.754 
                         (0.736)       (0.702)         (0.702)       (0.666)         (0.904)        (0.729)        (0.66)         (0.203)         (0.942) 
Durbin-W.        1.996          2.050            2.050         1.804           1. 585          1.320           1.651            1.857           1.568 
F-value             4.355***      3.120***        3.281***      3.834***        2.171**        2.704***       3.301***         2.788***        2.350*** 
Adj. R2             0.324          0.232            0.246         0.288            0.143           0.196           0.247            0.203           0.162 
N                         130            130                130            130               130              130              130               130              130 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses.  ***, **, * and † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: 
public accountability and transparency index (PATI); community services (COM); financial reporting (FIN); general services (GEN); report overview (REP); 
research (RES); teaching out (TOUT); teaching process (TPRO); university overview (UNI); governing board meetings (GBMs); governing board diversity 
(GBDIV); independent governors (IGOV); audit firm size (BIG4); governance committee (GCOM); audit committee quality (QBACI); financial performance 
(FINP); income growth (GROWTH); funding council income (IFUND); age (LNAGE); leverage (LEV); size (LNTA); liquidity (LQUID); Russel Group 
dummy (RGROUP); risk (RISK); and Vice-Chancellor gender (VCG). Table I fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table VI 
Effects of internal governance structures on public accountability disclosures: interaction effects, fixed-effects and IV 
Dependent variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. variables    PATI          PATI          PATI          PATI           PATI         PATI        PATI        PATI(FE)  PATI(IV) 
(Model)                   (1)               (2)             (3)              (4)               (5)               (6)             (7)              (8)                (9) 
Governing board characteristics: 
      GBMS         -0.604      -0.210        -0.060          -0.230       -0.198               -            -0.420        -0.380         -0.532 
              (0.244)     (0.690)        (0.997)        (0.489)      (0.596)             -            (0.274)    (0.347)      (0.254)     
     GBDIV         0.364**          0.352†          0.342†          0.330†      0.346†               -            0.375**       0.380**       0.399** 
                          (0.049)         (0.060)        (0.064)        (0.071)       (0.062)             -            (0.032)        (0.028)      (0.022) 
     GBSIZE       -0.084           -0.070          -0.065          -0.063       -0.040               -            -0.078        -0.043       -0.090   
                          (0.836)         (0.876)        (0.897)        (0.903)       (0.985)              -            (0.843)       (0.972)       (0.803) 
     IGOV           0.292†            0.283†         0.289†         0.265†        0.269†           0.354**       0.295†        0.302†          0.308† 
                         (0.075)          (0.080)        (0.076)        (0.090)       (0.087)        (0.048)       (0.064)       (0.058)       (0.054) 
Accounting/audit/governance committees:  
     BIG4             9.197†      9.065†          9.086†         9.095†         9.110†         9.134†   9.075†        9.208†        9.348† 
             (0.076)     (0.089)        (0.083)        (0.080)      (0.079)        (0.075) (0.086)     (0.073)      (0.067) 
     GCOM        17.562***       19.320***    16.376***      18.206***     12.766***       14.321        17.387***   18.348***   19.654*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)     (0.000) 
     QBACI         0.289†           0.276†        0.270†          0.286†         0.254†          0.343**        0.290†       0.312†       0.325† 
                          (0.067)          (0.073)       (0.078)        (0.069)        (0.083)        (0.040)       (0.062)      (0.056)      (0.053) 
Interaction variables: 
Governing board characteristics: 
   I*GBMS         -0.713     -0.245          -0.084         -0.298       -0.208                -             -0.482        -0.416         -0.654 
              (0.221)     (0.653)        (0.987)        (0.434)      (0.492)              -             (0.246)     (0.310)       (0.217)     
   I*GBDIV        0.396***        0.363**          0.384***      0.385***     0.388***       0.402***       0.410***       0.426***     0.438*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.049)        (0.010)        (0.008)       (0.005)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.010)       (0.000) 
   I*GBSIZE      -0.090           -0.085         -0.069          -0.070       -0.053                -            -0.086         -0.054        -0.096   
                          (0.825)         (0.853)        (0.875)        (0.885)       (0.972)              -            (0.869)       (0.956)       (0.785) 
   I*IGOV          0.306†            0.310†         0.318†         0.325†        0.296†           0.356**      0.329†        0.330†          0.345† 
                         (0.072)          (0.070)        (0.065)        (0.063)       (0.079)        (0.042)       (0.060)       (0.058)       (0.053) 
Accounting/audit/governance committees:  
   I*BIG4           9.206†      9.167†          9.187†          9.186†        9.074†          9.020†   9.324†        9.330†        9.356† 
             (0.072)     (0.078)        (0.086)        (0.089)      (0.092)        (0.098) (0.065)     (0.063)      (0.060) 
  I* GCOM       18.386***       19.454***    16.897***      18.643***     12.954***       14.532        17.654***   18.578***   19.896*** 
                          (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)     (0.000) 
  I*QBACI         0.294†           0.282†        0.275†          0.330†         0.302†          0.290†          0.338†       0.342†       0.350* 
                          (0.065)          (0.071)       (0.073)        (0.060)        (0.076)         (0.080)       (0.056)      (0.054)      (0.050) 
Control var.:  Included       Included    Included  Included         Included        Included     Included       Included  Included 
Constant         18.240           5.864            8.913         8.697            7.687          7.875         10.469           14.432         16.531 
                         (0.402)       (0.896)         (0.840)       (0.198)         (0.898)        (0.831)        (0.653)         (0.186)      (0.143) 
Durbin-W.        2.009          2.074            1.877         2.012           1. 965          1.994           2.070           2.084           2.098 
F-value             5.479***      5.596***        5.355***      5.482***        5.230***      5.326***       8.420***         9.843***      10.240*** 
Adj. R2             0.463          0.471            0.454         0.463            0.440           0.453         0.476            0.485           0.493 
N                         130            130                130            130               130              130            130               130              130  
Notes: P-values are in parentheses.  ***, **, * and † denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Table I fully defines all the 
variables used. Models 1 to 7 seek to test for the existence of an interaction effect between the internal governance structures and public accountability and 
transparency disclosures by interacting our three university executive management team variables (EFMS, ETDIV, and ETSIZE) with the our seven internal 
governance variables. Specifically, in Model 1, we interact EFMS with each of the seven internal governance variables and re-run the regression by 
including the newly created seven interactions variables in addition to the seven original variables and the control variables. In Model 2, we interact ETDVI 
with each of the seven internal governance variables and re-estimate the regression by including the newly created seven interactions variables in addition to 
the seven original variables and the control variables. In Model 3, we interact ETSIZE with each of the seven internal governance variables and re-estimate 
the regression by including the newly created seven interactions variables in addition to the seven original variables and the control variables. In Models 4 
and 5, we split the ETDVI variable into ETDIVG (i.e., the percentage of women members of university senior executive management team) and EBAME (i.e., 
percentage of Black, Asian and Ethnic Minorities members of university senior executive management team) interact each with each of the seven internal 
governance variables and re-estimate the regression by including the newly created seven interactions variables in addition to the seven original variables 
and the control variables in Models  4 and 5, for ETDIVG  and EBAME , respectively. In Models 6 and 7, we interact all three university executive team 
variables (i.e., EFMS, ETDIV, and ETSIZE) simultaneous with each of the seven internal governance variables and re-estimate the regression by including 
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the newly created seven interactions variables in addition to the seven internal governance original variables and the control variables, but we exclude GBMS 
and GBSIZE in Model 6, as they are persistently not statistically significant. In Models 8 and 9, we run fixed-effects (FE) and instrumental variables (IV) to 
account for the existence of potential firm level fixed-effects and endogeneity problems, respectively.  
 
 
